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present entrance requirement of two years of college work. The
new trustee regulation requiring three years of college preparation
for entrance to the Law School will take effect in September, 1932.
For the first time, the law students have a separate dormitory of
their own. The Carr Building, adjacent to the Law Building, has
been remodeled and set aside for this purpose. It now houses its
capacity of 62, all of whom are students in the Law School.
Last winter the faculty of the Law School presented 10 bills to
the General Assembly, proposing changes in the procedural law and,
to a less extent, changes in the substantive law of the state. Four of
these bills became law, including the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, as slightly revised by Professor Atwell C. McIntosh of the Law
School. To continue the process of law-school participation in law-
making thus begun, the legislature created the Law Improvement
Commission, to consist of representatives of the Wake Forest, Duke
and North Carolina law faculties, and of the laity and the bench and
bar. Judge George W. Connor of the Supreme Court is chairman
and Albert Coates of the Law School, secretary. The North Car-
olina Judicial Conference was abolished.
The new Constitutional Revision Commission has accepted the
Law School's offer of research assistance in connection with its work,
and has invited the Wake Forest College and Duke University Law
Schools to participate. In close relation to this work, Professor R. I-.
Wettach will conduct during the spring semester, a research course
in North Carolina Constitutional Law, with especial emphasis on the
need for amendment and revision.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Atto'rneys-Disbarment-Failure to Comply with Technical
Requirements of Disbarment Statute.
The case of Grievance Committee v. Strickland' is the first in
which disbarment proceedings founded upon a charge of "ambulance
chasing" have been reviewed by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The accusation, brought by the Grievance Committee of the State
Bar Association, was based upon the affidavit of Biggers, but the
accused was found guilty only on evidence furnished by Fellos,
Committee on Grievances of the State Bar Association v. Strickland, 200
N. C. 630, 158 S. E. 110 (1931).
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whose name appeared for the first time in the solicitor's citation.
Held, disbarment reversed, on the ground that the bounds of the
statute governing such proceedings had been exceeded.
Only in one instance2 has a disbarment proceeding been decided
on appeal unfavorably to a North Carolina attorney. The other de-
cisions rest on one of three technical considerations: (1) strict con-
struction of the statute, 3 (2) dubiously-worded disavowals, 4 and (3)
meticulous attention to terminology.5
By the majority of decisions, an action for disbarment is not
criminal in nature, but rather civil or even sui generis, and is to be
governed, not by the technical nicety of criminal pleadings, but by
rules peculiar to itself." Likewise, nearly all courts agree that pun-
ishment of the offending attorney is neither the primary nor the ulti-
mate purpose of the proceeding, but that it is invoked mainly to
protect the courts, the profession, and the public from ministration
by persons unfit to practice.7 If the accused is fully and fairly in-
formed of the general nature of the charges against him, and in a
broad sense the proof corresponds with the allegations, it has been
held that slight variations between proof and allegation are imma-
2State v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 799, 88 S. E. 437 (1916).
'Ex parte Schenck, 65 N. C. 353 (1871) (publishing letter derogatory to
superior court judge) ; Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C. 1 (1872) (failure to account
for client's money).4In re Moore, 63 N. C. 397 (1869) [disavowal admits purpose (of pub-
lication) was to express disapprobation of the conduct of individuals occupy-
ing high judicial stations] ; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202 (1870) (D insisted
that by becoming an attorney, he did not surrender any right as editor, and as
such was entitled "to fully comment on all public officers").
'In re Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190 (1908) ("convicted" held not
equivalent to "guilty").
'Philbrook v. Newman, 85 Fed. 139 (Circuit Court, Cal., 1898); Maloney
v. State, 182 Ark. 510, 32 S. W. (2nd) 423 (1930) ; Gould v. State, 127 So.
309 (1930) ; In re Ulmer, 268 Mass. 373, 167 N. E. 749 (1929) ; Re Vaughan,
189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353 (1922); People v. Stonecipher, 171 Ill. 506, 111
N. E. 496 (1916) (deposition taken in another state held admissible) ; It re
Breidt, 84 N. J. Eq. 222, 94 Atl. 214 (1915) ; State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91
At. 274 (1914) ; Bar Association v. Scott, 209 Mass. 200, 95 N. E. 402 (1911)
fraud proved in instance other than that named in petition) ; In re Ebbs, supra
note 5; It re Smith, 73 Kan. 743, 85 Pac. 584 (1906); (1921) MINN. L. REv.
141; (1921) CAT.. L. REv. 484. Contra: In re Eaton, 235 N. W. 587 (1931).
'McIntosh v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 261, 294 Pac. 1067 (1930); Gould v. State,
supra note 6; State v. Kern, 233 N. W. 629 (1930); In re Egan, 52 S. D.
394, 218 N. W. 1 (1928) ; State v. Ledbetter, 127 Okla. 85, 260 Pac. 454 (1927) ;
Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379 (1927); Re Vaughan, supra note 6;
Re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920) ; In re Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 116
N. E. 782 (1917) ; In re Breidt, supra note 6; Bar Association v. Greenhood,
168 Mass. 169, 46 N. E. 568 (1897) ; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct.
569 (1882) (leading case); (1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 141.
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terial.8 There is also authority for the statements that where the
charges are sufficient and clearly apparent upon the face of the com-
plaint, the procedure by which the matter is brought to the attention
of the court need not comply with any particular statutory or com-
mon-law form, and that discrepancies not invading some substantial
right of the respondent are not cause for reversal.9 Statutes, while
they may set up additional grounds for disbarment or define the
procedure to be utilized, are usually held to be merely cumulative,
and not to limit or impair the inherent constitutional right of the
court to deal with such cases in a proper, though non-statutory,
way ;1o nor should they be construed as importing to the general as-
sembly an intention to abridge such power.11
The statement by the court in the principal case, supported by
cases not dealing with disbarment, that a statutory method of pro-
cedure, if provided, "is exclusive and must be first resorted to and
in the manner specified therein," does not find support in "courts
everywhere."'1 2 But, conceding the statutory provisions to be the
basis of the action, the majority opinion appears to have miscon-
strued the requirements of the statute. Though it is provided that
proceedings "shall be instituted and prosecuted only by the Commit-
tee on Grievances of the North Carolina State Bar Association,"'1
'Bar Association of Boston v. Scott, supra note 6.
'In re Ulmer, supra note 6; it re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926);
State v. Peck, supra note 6 (complaint in narrative form) ; Hess v. Conway,
93 Kan. 246, 144 Pac. 205 (1914) ; Bar Association v. Scott, supra note 6; In
re Smith, supra note 6; State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45, 61 S. E. 355 (1908) ; Bar
Association v. Greenhood, supra note 7; it re Lowenthal, 78 Cal. 427, 21 Pac.
7 (1889) (facts stated in narrative form, no allegations connecting them with
charges) ; Ex parte Wall, supra note 7.
"In re Eaton, supra note 6; Gould v. State, supra note 6;, In re Royall, 34
N. M. 554, 286 Pac. 156 (1930); Re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N. E. 495
(1928) ; State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N. W. 603 (1928) ; Re Law Asso-
ciation, 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732 (1927); State v. Ledbetter, supra note 7;
Hertz v. U. S., 18 F. (2nd) 52 (C. C. A. Eighth Circuit, 1927) ; In re Wolfe's
Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732 (1927) ; State v. Reynolds, 22 N. M. 1,
158 Pac. 413 (1916); People v. Harris, 273 Ill. 413, 112 N. E. 978 (1916)
(allowing of testimony by unauthorized relator held no objection) ; Bar Com-
missioners v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703 (1912) ; Wernimont v. State,
101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W. 194 (1911) ; It re Tharcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N. E.
39 (1909) ; In re Egan, 22 S. D. 355, 117 N. W. 874 (1908) ; Ex parte Schenck,
supra note 3; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1154; (1928) 13 MiNN. L. REv. 62; see
Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 Atl. 33. (1930).
'lit re Egan, supra note 10; Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N. E. 199
(1896).
ni re Bailey, supra note 9; Re Law Association, supra note 10; In re
Wolfe's Disbarment, supra note 10; Bar Commissioners v. Sullivan, supra
note 10; In re Thatcher, supra note 10.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §208.
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there is also a requirement that in all cases the solicitor shall "appear
and prosecute the accusation and be responsible for the faithful dis-
charge of the duties required of him." 14  It is submitted that the
statute requires only that charges be initiated or "instituted" by the
grievance committee, and the solicitor, in securing additional affi-
davits, merely "faithfully discharged" his duties.15
JAMES M. LITTLE, JR.
Bankruptcy-Proof of Contingent Claims.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Maynard
v. Elliott' held that the liability of a bankrupt as endorser of nego-
tiable notes, some of which did not mature for more than a year after
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, was a provable claim against
his estate.
Section 63 of the present bankruptcy act in providing for claims
provable against the estate of a bankrupt makes no specific provision
for the proof of contingent claims.2 The status of the claim at the
time of the filing of the petition determines whether or not it is prov-
able.3 Hence the provability of contingent claims founded upon con-
tract depends on whether subdivision (1)4 of this section to the
N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §214.See People v. Harris, supra note 10.
Cited in appellant's brief were: In re Evans, 130 Pac. 217 (Utah, 1913);
Bar Association v. Sullivan, 185 Cal. 621, 198 Pac. 7 (1921) ; In re Hudson,
36 Pac. 812 (Cal., 1894) ; Grievance Committee v. Ennis, 84 Conn. 594, 80 Atl.
767 (1911) ; and People v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94, 75 N. E. 444 (1905). Three
of these would seem to be not in point The first decision rests upon the fact
that the petitioners were condemned unheard on charges concerning which no
evidence had been adduced; in the second ease no misconduct other than that
specifically charged was alleged in the accusation or included in charges filed;
and the last reversal was due to the lack of an affidavit to support the in-
formation. Nor did the fourth case turn alone on the technical point involved,
since the deficiency in the complaint was only "another reason" for setting
aside the order for suspension.
1283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390, 75 L. ed. 518 (1931) [reversing 40 F. (2d)
17 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930)].
'30 Stat. 562 (1898) 11 U. S. C. A. §103 (1927). "A contingent claim is one
as to which it remains uncertain, at the time of the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, whether or not the bankrupt will ever become liable to pay it." In re
Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58, 67 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916) ; (1927) 12 MiNN.
L. Rav. 60, n. 1.
'Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 33 Sup. Ct. 365, 57 L. ed. 676 (1913);
Swartz v. Fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; In re Bing-
ham, 94 Fed. 796 (D. Vt. 1899).
" (A) Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument
in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition against
him,... Bankruptcy Act, of 1898, mipra note 2.
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effect that a provable claim must be, "a fixed liability ... absolutely
owing at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy," shall
be construed as limiting subdivision (4)5 which provides for the
proof of claims founded upon a contract express or implied.
Prior to the decision in the principal case the proof of contingent
claims was a source of considerable confusion. In the case of Moch
v. Market Street National Bank6 the court permitted proof of a claim
against a bankrupt as indorser of negotiable notes due after the filing
of the petition on the ground that subdivision (1) and (4) are to be
construed as separate and independent; hence though contingent and
not provable under subdivision (1), the claim is provable under sub-
division (4) as founded upon contract. This constructiou of the
statute was followed by a majority of the lower federal courts as re-
gards claims on the indorsement of negotiable notes due after the
filing of the petition.7 By an opposite construction of the statute
claims for rent to accrue after the filing of the petition were by the
weight of authority held contingent and therefore not provable.8 I;
re Roth & Appel,9 again representing the majority view,1 0 held that
a claim based on a stipulation in the lease giving the lessor the right
to terminate the lease upon the bankruptcy of the lessee and hold the
lessee for the difference between the contract price and the re-rental
value of the premises was not provable because contingent, the court
'(A) Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are .... (4) founded upon an open account, or upon a contract express
or implied. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2.
'107 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1901).
TIn re Phillip Semmer Glass Co., 135 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1905) ; It re
Rothenburg, 140 Fed. 798 (S. D. N. Y. 1905) ; In re Smith, 146 Fed. 923 (D. R.
I. 1906) ; In re Amdur Shoe Co., 13 F. (2d) 147 (D. Mass. 1926) ; In re Henry
& S. G. Lindeman, 238 Fed. 639 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); In re Gerson, 105 Fed.
891 (E. D. Pa. 1901) ; In re Shatz, 251 Fed. 351 (E. D. Pa. 1918) ; In re T. A.
McIntyre & Co., 198 Fed. 579 (S. D. N. Y. 1912) ; In re Buzzini & Co., Inc.,
183 Fed. 827 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); see Heyman v. Third National Bank of
Jersey City, 216 Fed. 685, 687 (D. N. J. 1914). Contra: First National Bank
v. Elliott, 19 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) (the Moch case expressly dis-
approved).
'In re Rubel, 166 Fed. 131 (E. D. Wis. 1908); In re Mlle. Lemaud, Inc.,
13 F. (2d) 208 (D. Mass. 1926); Wells v. 21st St. Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; Britton v. Western Iowa Co., 9 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925); Coleman v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921) Contra:
In re Spies-Alper Co., 231 Fed. 535 (D. N. J. 1916). (the Moch case expressly
followed); Courtney v. Fidelity Trust Co., 219 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914).
'181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1910).
"°Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; In re Ells, 98 Fed.
967 (D. Mass. 1910); Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 1st, 1910).
Contra: In re Caloris Mfg. Co., 179 Fed. 722 (E. D. Pa. 1910) (the Moch case
expressly followed).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
attempting to distinguish the Moch case on its facts. However, an
acceleration clause which provides that in the event of the bankruptcy
of the lessee the lease shall terminate and all rent become immedi-
ately due creates a liability fixed and owing at the time of the filing
of the petition and is provable."1
Provisions for the collection of attorney's fees in notes of the
bankrupt maturing subsequent to the filing of the petition have been
held not provable as contingent ;12 guaranty contracts made by the
bankrupt where the principal obligation had not been breached before
the filing of the petition have been held not provable because con-
tingent ;13 while a surety contract under the same circumstances has
been held provable even though contingent. 14
The field of contingent claims provable under section 63 was con-
siderably widened when the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy
could be considered as an anticipatory breach of an executory con-
tract, creating a claim immediately due, founded upon contract and
provable as such.15 Under this decision the test of provability for
claims of this nature is very comprehensive, 16 easily covering claims
against a bankrupt on unexpired employment contracts.
1
"
'In re Kieth-Gara Co., 203 Fed. 585 (E. D. Pa. 1913) ; In re Schechter,
39 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930); In re Pittsburg Drug Co., 64 Fed. 482
(W. D. Pa. 1908).
"Its re Garlington, 115 Fed. 999 (N. D. Tex. 1902) ; In re Gimbel, 294 Fed.
883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923) ; In re Thompson, 144 Fed. 314 (W. D. Tex. 1906) ;
ef. British & American Mtg. Co. v. Stuart, 210 Fed. 425 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914)
(stipulation in mortgage due after the filing of the petition for the payment of
attorney's fees held not provable) ; First Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Stuppi,
2 F. (2d) 822 (C C. A. 8th, 1924) semble.
"It re Merrill & Baker, 186 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1911) ; In re Kaplan,
44 F. (2d) 669 (N. D. Tex. 1930) ; In re Adair Realty & Trust Co., 35 F. (2d)
531 (N. D. Ga. 1929); Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Pope, 22 F. (2d) 557 (S. D. N. Y.
1925) ; In re Pettingill & Co., 137 Fed. 143 (D. Mass. 1905).
"'it re Lyons Beet Sugar Refining Co., 192 Fed. 445 (W. D. N. Y. 1911).
"Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup.
Ct. 412, 60 L. ed. 811 (1916) (the court distinguishes claims for rent to accrue
after the filing of the petition as resulting from the "diversity between duties
which touch the realty, and the mere personalty," citing Co. Litt., 292, b, para
513) ; cf. Wells v. 21st St. Realty Co., supra note 8 (the court followed the
above distinction and refused to apply the doctrine of anticipatory breach to
rent to accrue after the filing of the petition).
""The test of provability under the act of 1898 may be stated thus: If the
bankrupt, at the time of the bankruptcy, by disenabling himself from perform-
ing the contract in question, and by repudiating its obligation, could give the
proving creditor the right to maintain at once a suit in which damages could
be assessed at law or in equity, then the creditor can prove in bankruptcy on
the ground that bankruptcy is the equivalent of disenablement and repudiation."
Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., supra note 15 at 592.
'In re Schultz & Guthrie, 235 Fed. 907 (D. Mass. 1916); In re Rouden
Mfg. Co., 278 Fed. 663 (E. D. N. Y. 1921).
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The purpose of the present bankruptcy act is to discharge the
bankrupt from existing obligations and distribute his assets ratably
among his creditors.' 8  By construing subdivision (4) as indepen-
dent of subdivision (1) the logic of the principal case would allow
proof of practically all contingent claims founded upon contract.
This construction seems to be in furtherance of the purpose of the
act, in that it allows these contingent claims to be proved and dis-
charged. A meritorious limitation upon this broad rule is found in
the English bankruptcy act to the effect that the amount of the
damages be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. 19
F. D. HAMRICK, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Validity of Foreign Contracts-
Effect of Domestic Usury Laws.
The receiver for a bankrupt North Carolina corporation sued the
defendant, a credit company, incorporated in Delaware with prin-
cipal office in Baltimore, for tvice the amount of usurious interest
allegedly paid by the lumber company.' By a "covering agreement"
the lumber company "sold" and the credit company "bought" ac-
ceptable accounts, notes, drafts, and other paper taken from the
former's customers and mailed to defendant in Baltimore. Defend-
ant advanced 77 per cent on acceptance and the balance when the
customer paid the lumber company as defendant's agent and the latter
remitted. If the customer did not pay, defendant served notice and
charged the amount back. For this and other services not deemed
material by the court, the credit company collected 1/30 of 1 per
cent of the net face value of accounts for each day, and other charges
amounting to 15 per cent. The contract stipulated that the law of
Delaware should govern, also that it was not to be effective until
accepted by defendant in Baltimore. (Corporations cannot take ad-
Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., supra note 15 at 591;
Williams v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554, 35 Sup. Ct. 289, 59 L. ed.
713 (1915).
"(1883) 46 & 47 VicT. c. 52, para. 37 (1) (3), 1 CHIT. STAT. 702; ef. Dun-
bar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084 (1903) (the con-
tract of a husband to pay his wife an annuity so long as she should remain a
widow held not a provable claim in bankruptcy because the value of the annuity
was so uncertain as to be incapable of estimation).
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §2306, provides that all interest is for-
feited for charging usury, and twice the interest may be recovered for usurious
interest paid.
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vantage of the usury statute in Delaware or Maryland.2 ) Held:
This was a loan. The contract was made in Maryland. If made in
good faith without intent to evade the North Carolina usury law,
Maryland law applies, otherwise North Carolina law. The issue of
good faith should have been submitted to the jury, hence reversed
and remanded.3
The first question is was this a loan or a sale? The court looks
through form to substance. 4 This is always the rule. Thus in one
case the language is found: "Where a transaction is in reality a loan
of money (it will be so treated), whatever may be its form," and
"by whatever name the charge may be called." The identical con-
tract involved in the instant case has been construed by one District
Court to be a loan, 5 and by another District Court to be a sale.6
Our court is "of the opinion that the agreement contemplates a loan."
This seems the sound, analytical view, for the credit company took
no risk, charging all unpaid accounts back to the lumber company.
The authorities are in great confusion as to what law governs the
validity of a contract, and the same court will often enunciate incon-
sistent theories. The courts have laid down three general rules:
(1) the law of the place of making; (2) the law of the place of per-
formance; (3) the law intended by the parties. The latter is the
English rule, probably the majority rule in this country, and is mod-
ified by presumptions and limitations.
7
Early North Carolina cases went on the intention rule. If there
was no place of payment or performance different from the place of
making, the court presumed the parties intended the law of the latter
place to govern, or they would have stipulated otherwise.8 Where
IMD. ANN. CODE (Baghy, 1924), art. 49, §5. No corporation can plead
usury as a defense, nor maintain an action based upon usury.
DELAWARE, GENERAL CoRPoRAroN ACT, §4, provides that corporations cre-
ated to deal in notes, accounts, etc., shall not be construed as engaging in the
business of banking, and may charge such amounts as the respective parties
agree upon.
I Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N. C. 511, 157 S. E. 860 (1931).
'Burwell v. Burgwyn, 100 N. C. 639, 6 S. E. 409 (1888) ; Bank v. Wysong,
177 N. C. 380, 99 S. E. 199 (1918) ; Lumber Co. v. Trust Co., 179 N. C. 211,
102 S. E. 205 (1919) ; Ripple v. Mortgage Co., 193 N. C. 422, 137 S. E. 156(1927).1 Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F. (2d) 724-30 (E. D. Pa. 1929).
'In re Eby, 39 F. (2d) 76 (E. D. N. C. 1929).
1 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 228.
SArrington v. Gee, 27 N. C. 590 (1845) ; Houston v. Potts, 64 N. C. 33
(1870); Williams v. Carr, 80 N. C. 294 (1879); Hilliard & Co. v. Outlaw, 92
N. C. 266 (1885); Morris v. Hockaday, 94 N. C. 286 (1886); Wood v.
Wheeler, 111 N. C. 231, 16 S. E. 418 (1892); Copeland v. Collins, 122 N. C.
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the places differed, some cases presumed that the parties intended the
law of the place of performance to govern,9 others the law of the
place of making.'0 But not if money was loaned at usury in another
state secured by a mortgage on land in North Carolina, 1 or if there
was evidence of intent to evade the North Carolina usury law,' 2 or
if the capacity of the contracting party, as a married woman, were
in question, the law of the forum-likewise the domicile-being
applied. 13 Unusually strong authority for the intention theory is
found in a decision of the elder Judge Connor written in 1907:
"That, in the absence of such a statute, the parties may agree upon
the place of the contract, is well settled."' 4
The latter cases practically all apply the law of the place of mak-
ing.15 This is the rule urged by the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws.'6 But the instant case talks about the presumption that the
parties intended, or must have intended, this law to govern. 17
619, 30 S. E. 315 (1898); Exchange Bank v. Appalachian Land and Lumber
Co., 128 N. C. 193, 38 S. E. 813 (1901) ; Cannady v. Railroad, 143 N. C. 439,
55 S. E. 836 (1906).
'Roberts v. McNeely, 52 N. C. 506 (1860).
" Bryan v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 133 N. C. 604, 45 S. E. 938
(1903) ; Hancock v. Telegraph Co., 137 N. C. 498, 49 S. E. 952 (1905) ; Hall
v. Telegraph Co., 139 N. C. 369, 52 S. E. 50 (1905); Johnson v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 144 N. C. 410, 57 S. E. 122 (1907). (All four of the
preceding cases were suits on the contract against telegraph companies for neg-
ligent transmission or delivery of messages.) Bank of Charlotte v. Simpson,
90 N. C. 467 (1884) ; Taylor v. Sharp, 108 N. C. 377, 13 S. E. 138 (1891).
"Commissioners of Craven v. Atlantic & N. C. Railroad Co., 77 N. C. 289
(1877); Rowland v. Old Dominion Building and Loan Association, 115 N. C.
825, 18 S. E. 965 (1894) ; Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association,
116 N. C. 882, 21 S. E. 924 (1895) ; Faison v. Grandy, 128 N. C. 438, 38 S. E.
,397 (1901).
"Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association, 112 N. C. 842, 17 S. E.
637 (1893) ; see Roberts v. McNeely, 52 N. C. 506 at 508 (1860).
"
2Armstrong, Cator & Co. v. Best, 112 N. C. 59, 17 S. E. 14 (1893) ; Han-
over National Bank v. Howell, 118 N. C. 271, 23 S. E. 1005 (1896).
'Williams v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 145 N. C. 128, 58
S. E. 802 (1907).
' National Exchange Bank of Baltimore v. Rook Granite Co., 155 N. C.
-43, 70 S. E. 1002 (1911) ; Pfeifer & Co. v. Israel, 161 N. C. 409, 77 S. E. 421
(1913) ; Carpenter, Baggott & Co. v. Hanes, 167 N. C. 551, 83 S. E. 577 (1914) ;
Wilson v. Order of Heptasophs, 174 N. C. 628, 94 S. E. 443 (1917) ; Kesler v.
Iutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 177 N. C. 394, 99 S. E. 207 (1919).
D~raft No. 2, §§333, 353.
" CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1931), Proposed Final
' Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., Jupra note 3. "It is a generally accepted
principle that 'the test of the place of a contract is as to the place at which the
last act was done by either of the parties essential to a meeting of the minds.'
It is clear the contract was executed in Baltimore, because the last act essential
ito completion of the agreement was performed there. Nothing else appearing,
it follows that the parties intended the laws of Maryland to govern its validity
and performance."
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And there are exceptions: where the contract is contrary to a
state statute ;18 contrary to good morals ;19 injurious to the forum or
its citizens;20 violative of the fixed public policy of the state;21
where the loan or place of payment is in another state, but is secured
by a loan upon real estate here, even though the contract stipulated
the law of another state should govern ;22 and others.
23
In the usury cases there is still a strong tendency to adopt the
intention test, presuming the intention of the parties to be to adopt
the law which will make their contract valid.24 It is required, how-
ever, that there be no bad faith and no intent to evade the usury
law.2 5 This issue of good faith, which the court says should have
gone to the jury in the instant case, often becomes very difficult to
decide. It is especially so when the court reverses a former posi-
tion26 and says that the charging of more than 6 per cent interest
under a contract made in another state is not necessarily contrary to
public policy. One commentator observes that this is attaching a
penalty to knowledge of the law.
27
The issue of the principal case becomes impressively important
in this era of industrialization of North Carolina. Briefly, do we
need and do we want 15 per cent loans, and can our industry prosper
on 15 per cent loans? Or is this better than no capital available at a
theoretical rate of 6 per cent? The court seems to have been very
cognizant of the issues at times.2
8
MARION R. ALEXANDER.
'Burrus v. Witcover, 158 N. C. 384, 74 S. E. 11 (1912); Bluthenthal &
Beckhart, Inc. v. Kennedy, 165 N. C. 372, 81 S. E. 337 (1914) ; Standard Fash-
ion Co. v. Grant, 165 N. C. 453, 81 S. E. 606 (1914).
See Burrus v. Witcover, .upra note 18, at 385.
:' See Burrus v. Witcover, spra note 18, at 385.
= Bluthenthal & Beckhart, Inc. v. Kennedy, supra note 18; Williamson v.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 151 N. C. 223, 65 S. E. 974 (1909) [Stipula-
tion on telegraph message limiting liability of telegraph company for trans-
mitting unrepeated message. The federal rule applies now and this is changed-
Hardie v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 190 N. C. 45, 128 S. E. 500 (1925)1.
See Burrus v. Witcover, supra note 18, at 385.
' Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association, supra note 11.
See special exception in usury cases, infra note 25, supra note 4.
"' Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., supra note 3.
"Arrington v. Gee, supra note 8; Roberts v. McNeely, supra note 9; Hous-
ton v. Potts, supra note 8; Morris v. Hockaday, supra. note 8; Ripple v. Mort-
gage Corporation, supra note 4; Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., supra note
3.
, Ripple v. Mortgage Corporation, supra note 4.
'
t Note (1921) 21 CoL L. REv. 585.
n Burwell, J., in Meroney v. Atlanta Building and Loan Association, supra
note 11, at 889: "Comity does not require that we allow foreign corporations
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Corporations-Agency-Imputation of Knowledge Where Two
Corporations Have Common Officer or Agent.
A was vice-president and general manager of X corporation and
also secretary and treasurer of Y corporation. The two corpor-
ations occupied the same offices and had virtually the same board of
directors. Y corporation made a loan on land which X corporation,
three years previously, had foreclosed as trustee under a deed of
trust. A knew that X corporation had failed to pay, out of the pro-
ceeds of the foreclosure sale, certain bonds secured by the foreclosed
deed of trust. In an action by the holder of the unpaid bonds, held,
inter aia, that A's knowledge that the bonds had not been paid was
not imputed to Y corporation.1
The general rule is that notice to, or knowledge of,2 a corporate
officer or agent while he is acting in his official capacity or within
the scope of his authority, and in relation to a matter which his
authority comprehends, is imputable to the corporation.8 Knowledge
is attributed to the corporate principal by a rule of substantive law
which renders actual communication immaterial 4 and which has for
to enforce contracts here if such enforcement would work against our own
citizens, and give to foreigners an advantage which the resident citizen has
not."
'Cheeck v. Squires et al., 200 N. C. 661, 158 S. E. 198 (1931). Conceivably
it might have been urged that the two corporations were so nearly identified
that there should have been a disregard of the corporate fiction and that knowl-
edge should have been imputed. See, generally, Ballantine, Separate Entity of
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1927) 100 CENT. L. J. 107 or (1925) 14
CALn. L. REv. 12; (1929) 42 HARV. L. Rrv. 1077. But this approach did not
appear in briefs of counsels, nor was it alluded to in the opinion.
"Notice" and "knowledge" are distinguishable, though often treated synon-
omously. See 4 FLETCHER, CYcLoPErA OF CORPORATIONS (1918) §2216. "Ab-
solute notice" and "notice which means knowledge" are discussed in Seaver,
Notice To An Agent (1916) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1.
'Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 239, 35 L.
ed. 1063 (1892) ; Follette v. U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n., 110 N. C. 377, 14
S. E. 923 (1892) ; LeDuc v. Moore et al., 111 N. C. 516, 15 S. E. 888 (1892) ;
Short v. LaFayette Life Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 649, 140 S. E. 302 (1927) ; BAL-
LANTiNE, CORPORATIONS (1927) 112; 4 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, §2215;
for general agency background, see Note (1925) 10 IowA L. BuL 231.
' 10 IowA L. BULL., supra note 3, at 234, 235. True, any liability resulting
from the imputation of notice attaches to the corporation in its abstract sense,
that is, as a legal entity; but it is erroneous to conceive of imputation as based
on a duty to communicate to the corporation as an impersonal entity. For
since the corporate functions can be realized only through natural persons act-
ing as agents, communication must (except in the case of notice directly to a
stockholders' meeting) be to some duly authorized officers or agents who are,
for the particular transaction, "the corporation." These persons may be those
who acquire the knowledge; or they may be those "higher up" in the corporate
organization to whom the persons who acquire the knowledge are under a duty
to communicate. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, TENTATIVE DRAFT 5, §500; 2
MECHEm, AGENCY. (2d ed. 1914) §1843.
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its object the protection of third persons who deal with the cor-
poration.5
There are three well established exceptions to the general rule.
Knowledge is not imputable: (1) where the knowledge consists of
confidential communications which it would be improper for the
agent to disclose ;6 (2) where the officer or agent is acting in his own
or in another's interest and adversely to the corporation ;7 (3) where
the party seeking to have the knowledge imputed colluded with the
officer or agent to defraud the corporation. 8 Many courts recognize
an exception to exception (2): even if the conduct of the officer
or agent is adverse to the interest of the corporation, his knowledge
will be imputed if he is the sole representative of the corporation in
the transaction. 9
There is substantial authority for the rule that knowledge is not
imputable if it be acquired by the officer or agent before the period
of agency or within the period of agency while he was acting in his
private or individual capacity.1 0 But the view which prevails in
England,"1 and that which has been recognized by the Supreme
'MEC aEm, op cit. supra note 4, §1802.
' Sebald v. Citizens Bank, 105 S. W. 130 (Tex. 1907).TAmerican Nat. Bank of Nashville v. Miller, 229 U. S. 517, 33 Sup. Ct. 883,
57 L. ed 1310 (1913) ; Ohio Millers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Bank, 39 F. (2d)
400 (C. C. A. 5th 1930) (adverse interest relied on inter alia) ; Innerity v.
Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282 (1885) ; Corcoran v. Snow Cattle Co., 151
Mass. 74, 23 N. E. 727 (1890); see Bank v. Burgwyn et at., 110 N. C. 267, 275,
276, 14 S. E. 623, 624 (1891); (1925) 19 Iu. L. REV. 595; (1929) 15 VA. L.
Rlv. 782. For a slightly different statement of essentially the same exception,
see (1924) 8 MiNN. L. REv. 452.8 Western Mortgage & Investment Co. Ltd. v. Ganzer et al., 63 Fed. 647(C. C. A. 5th, 1894) ; MEcHmE, fuprai note 4, §1826; this exception applies to
corporations; ibid. §1845.
' First Nat. Bank of Blaine v. Blake, 60 Fed. 78 (D. Ore. 1894) ; McFerson
et al. v. Bristol, 73 Colo. 214, 214 Pac. 395 (1923) ; Mays et al. v. First State
Bank of Keller, 247 S. W. 845 (Tex. 1923) ; State Bank of Pamplin v. Payne
et al., 159 S. E. 163 (Va. 1931); 2 FLFTcHER, op. cit. supra note 2, §2251;
(1925) 12 VA. L. REv. 73; (1926) 39 HARV. L. Rav. 645. The North Carolina
court seems to have recognized what was in effect the "sole representative"
rule in Brite v. Penny, 157 N. C. 87, 72 S. E. 964 (1911). Apparently this
doctrine is not squarely accepted by the U. S. Supreme Court. See Curtis,
Collins, and Holbrook v. United States, 262 U. S. 215, 224, 43 Sup. Ct. 570, 573,
67 L. ed. 956, 960 (1923) ; see also Kean et al. v. National City Bank, 294 Fed.
214, 224 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
"
0Brennan et al. v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry-Goods Co., 99 Fed. 971 (W. D.
Mo. 1900); Peoples Bank of Talbotton v. Exchange Bank of Macon, 116 Ga.
820, 43 S. E. 269 (1902) ; Bangor & P. Ry. Co. v. American Bangor Slate Co.
et al., 203 Pa. 6, 52 Atl. 40 (1902) ; Taylor et al. v. Taylor et al., 88 Tex. 47,
29 S. W. 1057 (1895) ; Grayson County Nat. Bank v. Hall, 91 S. W. 807 (Tex.
1906). This rule was recognized as to the agent of a, natural person in War-
rick v. Warrick and Kniveton, 3 Atkyns 219 (1745).
'Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466 (1864).
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Court of the United States12 as well as by many of the state courts,
is that any knowledge which the agent possesses (i.e., which is actu-
ally present in his mind) while he is acting with regard to the subject
matter of his agency and which is so pertinent to the subject matter
that he owes a duty to communicate it, is imputable to the corpor-
ation, regardless of when such knowledge wa acquired.'3
Where two corporations which deal with each other have a com-
mon officer or agent, the question is presented: is his knowledge
imputable to either or both corporations?
If the officer or agent acts with the consent of both corporations,
and he owes a duty to each to communicate his knowledge, both
principals will be charged with his knowledge. 14 Where there is no
such consent, and the two corporations are adversely interested,
there are two possible situations: (1) if the officer or agent repre-
sents only one of them, his knowledge is obviously imputable to this
one alone ;15 (2) if he occupies a representative position in both, it is
said that there is a conflict of duty on his part, and there is no impu-
tation, the question of knowledge under such circumstances depend-
ing on actual communication. 16 It may be generally stated that
where there is an interlocking officer or agent, his knowledge is not
imputable to either of the corporations unless he acquires or possesses
the knowledge under such circumstances that it becomes his duty to
communicate it. 17
Two reasons (perhaps three' 8) are advanced in support of the
"The Distilled Spirits," 11 Wall. (U. S.) 356, 20 L. ed. 367 (1871).
'Willard v. Denise, 50 N. J. Eq. 482, 26 At. 29 (1893) ; Craigie ct al. v.
Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131, 1 N. E. 537 (1885); Union Bank v. Campbell, 23 Tenn.
(4 Humph.) 394 (1843) ; Tagg v. Tennessee Nat. Bank, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.)
479 (1870); see Red River Land & Investment Co. v. Smith, 7 N. D. 236, 74
N. W. 194, 197 (1898). MECHEM, mspra note 4, §1850.
"'First State Bank of Keota v. Bridges, 39 Okla. 355, 135 Pac. 378 (1913).
"Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 156, 162 Pac. 631
(1917) ; Benton et al. v. German American Nat. Bank, 122 Mo. 332, 26 S. W.
975 (1894); Central Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Pipkin, 66 Mo. App. 592
(1896); Cherry v. First Texas Chemical Mfg. Co. et al., 144 S. W. 306 (Tex.
1912) ; Casco Nat. Bank of Portland v. Clark et al., 139 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E.
908 (1893) ; Wardlaw v. Troy Oil Mill, 74 S. C. 368, 54 S. E. 658 (1906).
'Note (1886) 36 Am. Dec., 188, 193.
'In re Fenwick, Stobart Co., Ltd., (1902) 1 Ch. 507, in which Buckley, 3.,
says: "What the court has to see is WIhether the information he gets, as sec-
retary of one company, comes to him under such circumstances as that it is his
duty to communicate it to the other company." 3 THoMPSON, CORPORATIONS
(3d ed. 1927) §1770.
" Mr. Justice Connor states in the opinion that there was no finding that
A "acted for or represented" Y corporation in the negotiation of the loan, but
does not comment further on this. If A did not represent Y corporation in
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holding in the instant case: (1) A did not acquire the knowledge
while acting as an officer of Y corporation; (2) it was to the interest
of X corporation that Y corporation should not know of irregularities
in title to the land; hence, it could not be presumed that A would
communicate the knowledge to Y corporation.
The fact that A did not acquire the knowledge while acting as an
officer of Y corporation would not have been conclusive, in many
jurisdictions, if it had appeared that he had acted for Y corporation
with the knowledge actually in mind;19 but there was no such find-
ing. Furthermore, the sole-representative doctrine is not applicable
to the facts.20 The second reason advanced seems entirely adequate.
That A would communicate his knowledge to Y corporation under
the circumstances is contrary to experience. 21
Wm. ADAMs, JR.
Criminal Law-Effect of Void Sentence.
Plaintiff was indicted on three counts, convicted and sentenced to
one term of one year and one day and to two terms of six months
each; confinement in Leavenworth. A federal statute provided that
no prisoner be sentenced to a penitentiary except the period be for
longer than one year.' After plaintiff had served the first two terms
and two months on the third, he petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, contending that the sentence under which he was serving was
void in that the court did not have jurisdiction to impose it. Held,
sentences two and three are void. Writ ordered to be issued but with-
out prejudice to the United States to have plaintiff sentenced in ac-
cordance with the law on the verdict against him.2
the particular transaction, there remains only one possibility of imputation of
knowledge through A to Y corporation; and that is, that A's authority was so
general as to constitute him the alter ego of the corporation in respect to all
its business. The statement of facts would indicate that he had quite general
authority: "The two corporations occupied the same offices and were under the
general control and management of" A. Does the court recognize such gen-
eral authority in A, or instead, does it regard his authority as limited, and
therefore rely on the absence of a finding that he was acting in regard to a
matter over which his authority extended?
See note 13, supra.
Because Y corporation was also represented in the transaction by a loan
committee, which considered the details of the loan. See McFerson et al. v.
Bristol, supra note 9, at 396, in which the court intimates that the sole actor
rule would not have been applicable had there been a discount committee in-
volved, and not only the agent alone.
' 14a C. J. 491, §2359 (2).
'13 Stat. 500 (1865), 18 U. S. C. A. §695 (1927).
'Copeland v. Archer, 50 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
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If plaintiff was guilty of three separate offences, sentences two
and three were rightly held to be void,a since it is necessary that judg-
ments in criminal cases conform strictly to the statute both as to the
character and extent of the punishment inflicted.4 But under the
doctrine of Ex parte Friday,5 which is to the effect that where there is
but one indictment, one trial and one judgment, there can be but a
single sentence, the sentence in the instant case would not be treated
as void but as merely irregular, and the term of imprisonment there-
under as for two years and one day-the total of the three sentences.
The weight of authority sustains the principal case, but query
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Friday does not offer a better solu-
tion. Under the principal case, the plaintiff was not freed when the
writ of habeas corpus was granted, but, having been lawfully con-
victed, he was subjected to the possibility of a longer sentence; 6
whereas, under Ex parte Friday, the sentence would have been valid
except for the excess 7 over the statutory provisions (one day8 ), and
the writ would not have issued.9  PAUL BOUCHER.
'Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U. S. 396, 23 L. ed. 889 (1876) (as to when con-
finement must be in a federal penitentiary, when in a state penitentiary, and
when discretionary).
"Harman v. U. S., 50 Fed. 921 (D. Kan. 1892) ; Harman v. U. S., 68 Fed.
742 (D. Kan. 1895) (motion to resentence) ; Woodruff v. U. S., 58 Fed. 776
(D. Kan. 1893) ; Reynolds v. U. S., 96 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878) ; In re
Pridgeon, 57 Fed. 200 (S. D. Ohio, 1893) ; it re Christian, 82 Fed. 199 (W. D.
Ark. 1897) ; Ex parte Karstendick, supra note 3; In re Graham, 138 U. S. 461,
11 Sup. Ct. 363, 34 L. ed. 1051 (1890) ; Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. 163, 21 L. ed.
872 (1873) ; In re, Mills, supra note 4; It re Johnson, 46 Fed. 477 (D. Mass.
1891) ; Whitworth v. U. S., 114 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; BYRNE, FED-
ERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §365.
'43 Fed. 916 (N. D. N. Y. 1890) (fact situation similar to principal case;
indictment for larceny on three counts with three separate sentences, one and
two being for one year each confinement to be in a penitentiary).
'In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 10 Sup. Ct. 384, 33 L. ed. 835 (1889) ; In re
Christian, supra note 4; Hammers v. U. S., 279 Fed. 265 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) ;
It re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 14 Sup. Ct. 323, 38 L. ed. 107 (1890) ; U. S. v.
Harman, sipra note 4; U. S. v. Motherwell, 103 Fed. 198 (E. D. Pa. 1900)
rehearing 107 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1901). Contra: Ex parte Lange, supra
note 4. Cf. Ny Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. 492, 66 L. ed.
938 (1921) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 40 Sup. Ct. 566, 64 L. ed.
1011 (1919); Chin Yow v. U. S., 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 182, 52 L. ed. 379
(1919) ; Charlie Wong v. Esola, 6 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
" De Bara v. U. S., 99 Fed. 942 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900) ; Harlan v. McGourin,
218 U. S. 442, 31 Sup. Ct. 44, 54 L. ed. 1101 (1910) ; U. S. v. Peeke, 153 Fed.
156 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1907); Collins v. Morgan, 243 Fed. 495 (C. C. A. 8th,
1917).
'35 Stat. 1113 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §240 (1927) (maximum sentence two
years).
'De Bara v. U. S., supra note 7; In re Pridgeon, supra note 4; In re
Bonner, supra note 6; In re Swan, 150 U. S. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. 225, 37 L. ed. 787
(1893).
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Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Tests for
Identity of Offense.
Defendant was indicted for larceny of six bushels of corn. He
pleaded autrefois acquit, contending that he had previously been in-
dicted for the identical offense. Held, plea good; the two offenses
grew out of the same transaction and only one indictment can be
sustained therefor.1
Three principal tests for the identity of offenses have been applied
by the courts. (1) The "same evidence" rule inquires whether de-
fendant could have been convicted on the first indictment upon proof
of the facts alleged in the second.2 (2) The "same transaction" test
asks whether the crimes grew out of a single transaction.3 (3) The
"lessential element" test looks to whether the first prosecution was for
any essential part or whole of the crime prosecuted in the second in-
dictment. 4 Some courts use these as interchangeable, some as
mutually exclusive,6 and others as over lapping.7 An application of.
these rules to concrete fact situations reveals some interesting results.
1 Harris v. State, 159 S. E. 603 (Ga. 1931).2Winn v. State, 82 Wis. 571, 52 N. W. 775 (1892); Barker v. State, 189
Ind. 263, 120 N. E. 593 (1918) ; 16 Coaius Junis 264; CLARK, CRIMINAL PRO-
cmurP (2nd ed. 1923), 457; 1 BIsHoP, CRI.MNAL LAw (9th ed. 1923)
§1052. The North Carolina rule is stated by Ruffin, J., in State v. Nash, 86
N. C. 650, 41 Am. Rep. 472 (1882): "the true test is, 'could the defendant
have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the facts, not as
brought forward in evidence, but as alleged in the record of the second'."
'It is a fundamental rule of law that out of the same facts a series of
charges shall not be preferred," Cockburn, J., in Regina v. Elrington, 1 B. & S.
688, 9 Cox C. C. 86 (1861); Jones v. State, 55 Ga. 625 (1876); Newton v.
Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 707, 249 S. W. 1017 (1923) ; State v. Keep, 85 Ore.
265, 166 Pac. 936 (1917); 16 CoRaus Juais 272; 1 BisnoP, CRIMINAL LAw
(9th ed. 1923) §1051.
'"It is elementary to say that a prosecution for any part of a single crime
bars any further prosecution based upon the whole or part of the crime,"
Hurt, C. J., in Runyon v. Morrow, 192 Ky. 785, 234 S. W. 304, 19 A. L. R.
632 (1921) ; U. S. v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992 (N. D. Ill. 1923) ; Sanford v. State,
75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918) ; State v. Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138, 223 Pac. 762
(1924) ; 16 CoRus Jums 270.
'Mitchell v. State, 16 Ala. App. 635, 80 So. 730 (1918) (The first decision
of the court was based on a combination of the "essential element" and "same
transaction" tests, while a rehearing rested its decision on the "same evidence!"
test.) ; State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879) ; Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 101 Ky.
603, 42 S. W. 117 (1897) ; Arrington v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 96, 12 S. E. 224
(1890).
' Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632, 35 Sup. Ct. 712, 59 L. ed. 1153 (1915);
U. S. v. Farhat, 269 Fed. 33 (S. D. Ohio 1920) ; Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 9
(1853) ; Foran v. State, 195 Ind. 55, 144 N. E. 529 (1924) ; State v. Jacobson,
197 Iowa 1028, 198 N. W. 329 (1924).
" Autrefois acquit is only available in cases where the transaction is the
same and the two indictments are susceptible of, and must be sustained by the
same proof," White, P. J., in Simco. v. State, 9 Tex. App. at 348 (1880);
74 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In a 1931 federal case8 defendant was indicted for illegally selling
morphine. Three counts were based on a statute requiring sales to
be from the original package, and others on a statute requiring a
government order before any sale. The sales were on successive days
to the government detective. An application of the "same evidence"
test allowed conviction on all counts.9 The same facts would have
given rise to an identical holding under the "essential element" test,
The sale without order was in no way an integral part of the sale
from an illegal package. In analogous situations under the "same
transaction" rule the series of sales might be considered one offense 10
or several. 1
In California, a defendant was indicted for attempting to murder
his wife. By the shot intended for her, he killed another person.
On the murder indictment he pleaded the attempt indictment as
former jeopardy.' 2 The "same evidence" rule would not allow the
plea. If a murder was proved to have been committed by defendant,
it could not have convicted him on the first trial for an attempt on the
life of another. Nor is an attempt on one person's life in any way an
"'essential element" of the murder of another. On the "same trans-
action" test a division of opinion exists,' 3 but some courts would hold
but one offense indictable. 14
"The rule is that where one offense is a necessary element in, and constitutes
part of another and both are in fact one transaction, an acquittal or conviction
of one should bar prosecution for the other," Snow, J., in People v. Cook, 236
Mich. 333, 210 N. W. 296 (1926); State v. Foster, 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255
k(1924) ; State v. Shaver, 197 Iowa 1028, 198 N. W. 329 (1924).8 Blockburger v. U. S., 50 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
' "It cannot be said that the evidence necessary to establish the truth of
-either of the two counts in controversy would establish the other, for indeed
the opposite is true," Sparks, J., in Blockburger v. U. S., vpra note 8.
"o "I do not think the penalty section of the statute contemplates such double
punishment for the same transaction .... I believe that this 'one and continuous
performance,' initiated and enacted under the 'personal direction' of the gov-
ernment agent, and financed by the government, represents but a single in-
fraction of the law," Alschuyler, J., dissenting in Blockburger v. U. S., supra
note 8; State v. Needham, 194 Mo. App. 201, 186 S. W. 585 (1916) ; State v.
Covington, 147 Tenn. 659, 222 S. W. 1 (1920); State v. Linton, 283 Mo. 1,
217 S. W. 874 (1920).
4Bowman v. State, 23 Ala. App. 504, 127 So. 911 (1930) ; State v. Cleaver,
196 Iowa 1278, 196 N. W. 119 (1923) ; State v. Wilbur, 85 Ore. 565, 166 Pac.
51 (1917) ; State v. Keep, supra note 3, See State v. Sepanic, 117 Kans. at
110, 230 Pac. at 306 (1924).
"People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924).
"Note (1922) 20 A. L. R. 341; Note (1883) 41 Am. Rep. 475.
" "The same transaction test adopted in this state may make a trial for the
murder of one person a bar to the prosecution for assault with intent to mur-
der a different person. For instance, if they defendant shot at A, intending to
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Suppose a defendant has killed three persons by rapidly successive
shots, and pleads acquittal for A's murder in defense of that of C.15
Proof of the missiles striking each of the three would be entirely
different, thus three indictments would lie on the "same evidence"
rule.16 The act in relation to one of the three was no "essential" part
of the act in relation to another, hence three indictments lie on the
"essential element" rule. Conceding three transactions to have taken
place, each shot constituting one, the question arises as to what would
be the situation where one shot kills three persons. Some courts
have carried the "same transaction" test to its logical conclusion and
would, on a basis of previous decisions, sustain but one indictment.17
The "same transaction" test then is flexible, leaving to the court
the definition of a single transaction. But the other tests are also
flexible, changing with application. From a practical standpoint the
courts in effect reach the same conclusions on any of the tests, with
the possible exception, as noted, of the "same transaction" test, where
several offenses grow out of the same act.
ERNEST W. EWBANX, JR.
Criminal Law-Quashing Indictment for Incompetent
Evidence Before Grand July.
The defendant moved to quash his indictment on the ground that
all the evidence (testimony of two witnesses) heard by the grand jury
was hearsay and incompetent. Motion denied, and, in affirming, the
Supreme Court held: There is a distinction to be made between in-
kill him, and by reason of bad marksmanship struck and killed B, whom he
did not intend to kill, the transaction, the assault with intent to kill A and the
actual murder of B are legally the same." Powell, J., in Burnam v. State, 2
Ga. App. 395, 58 S. E. 683 (1907) ; Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632
(1896) (the court draws the distinction here between a situation where two
shots are fired and where only one occurs) ; Hurst v. State, 86 Ala. 604, 6 So.
120 (1889) ; Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873).
-State v. Corbett, 117 S. C. 356, 109 S. E. 133, 20 A. L. R. 328 (1921).
" The court's decision rested on an application of the "same evidence" test,
it being held that a different proof was necessary in the case of each murder.
IT The following cases represent the development of the rule in Georgia:
Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8 (1853) ; Holt v. State, 38 Ga. 187 (1868) ; Knight
v. State, 73 Ga. 804 (1884) ; Lock v. State, 122 Ga. 730, 50 S. E. 932 (1905) ;
Burnam v. State, supra note 14; see 1 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923)
§1064. It appears in Lillie v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. Rep. 615 at 616, 187 S. W.
482 at 483 (1916), that in the opinion of the court, if two persons are killed or
injured by the same shot, a conviction of the murder or assault of one of them
would be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the murder or assault of the
other. The cases of Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 466 46 S. W. 639
(1898) ; and Wright v. State, 17 Tex. App. 152 (1884), would sustain but one
conviction on a plea of autrefois convict.
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competent evidence and disqualified witnesses as ground for a motion
to quash. Only in the latter case, and where all of the witnesses
before the grand jury were disqualified, should the indictment be
quashed.'
There are at least three rules with regard to quashal of an indict-
ment on the ground of incompetency or illegality of evidence heard
by the grand jury.2 (1) Some courts hold that an indictment cannot
be quashed for this cause unless all of the evidence was incompetent,
and, if there was the slightest legal or competent evidence, the court
cannot inquire into the matter of its sufficiency.3 (2) New York ad-
mits the total-incompetency test, but adds that in extreme instances the
indictment may be quashed also for insufficiency.4 (3) A rule, which
appears to be increasingly favored, is that the court is without power
to go behind the indictment to examine the evidence heard, and con-
sequently an indictment can in no case be quashed for incompetency
or illegality of evidence.5 Any other course, it is said, would destroy
the secrecy of proceedings before the grand jury; moreover, the
grand jury is an inquisitorial body, its finding is not final, and all
illegal evidence will be excluded on the trial of the case. 6 The latter
rule is followed in a number of states where statute provides that
none but legal evidence shall be heard.' The apparent effect of such
statutes is avoided by the desirable but tenuous construction that they
are merely directory and do not empower the court to disturb the
grand jury's finding.8
'State v. Levy, 200 N. C. 586, 158 S. E. 94 (1931).
2 See Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1479.
'Royce v. Territory, 5 Okla. 61, 47 Pac. 1083 (1897); State v. Logan, 1
Nev. 509 (1865); Estill v. State, 277 P. 256 (Okla. 1929) ; United States v.
Rubin, 218 F. 245 (D. Conn. 1914) ; People v. Duncan, 261 I1. 339, 103 N. E.
1043 (1913) ; State v. Coates, 130 N. C. 701, 41 S. E. 706 (1902).
"People v. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, 80 N. E. 396, 116 Am. St. Rep. 621(1907). And see People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395, 66 N. E. 112, 115 '(1903);
People v. Hess, 110 Misc. 76, 179 N. Y. Supp. 734, 739 (1920). Several de-
cisions by the Federal courts have indicated that an indictment found on
"utterly insufficient or palpably incompetent" evidence may be quashed, but the
prerogative is more sparingly exercised than in New York. McKinney v.
United States, 199 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; United States v. Silverthorne,
265 Fed. 853 (W. D. N. Y. 1920).
'State v. Chance, 29 N. M. 34, 221 Pac. 183, 31 A. L. R. 1466 (1923);
People v. Collins, 60 Cal. App. 263, 212 Pac. 701 (1923) ; Holliman v. State,
108 Tex. Crim. Rep. 92, 299 S. W. 249 (1927) ; Murphy v. State, 171 Ark. 620,
286 S. W. 871 (1926).
'State v. Chance, supra note 5.
'People v. Fealy, 33 Cal. App. 605, 165 Pac. 1034 (1917) ; State v. Chance,
supra note 5; Murphy v. State, supra note 5.
'Murphy v. State, supra note 5.
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The purpose of the grand jury is to seek probable cause for trial;
its indictment is a formal accusation and in no way a final adjudica-
tion against the defendant. On principle, it would seem that rule
(3) is the sound one.9 North Carolina, until the Levy decision, has
blandly followed the total-incompetency rule.' 0 The language of the
principal case manifests an inclination to hold with the modern trend
that in no case can the court examine the evidence, but precedent
forbade such a course; hence the distinction between disqualified wit-
nesses and incompetent evidence. The writer's investigation has not
revealed that a like distinction obtains in any other jurisdiction. The
North Carolina court failed to complete its jump toward the liberal
view, and appears to have established a rule quite its own.
J. G. ADAMS, JR.
Criminal Law-,Sufficiency of Indictment Under National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act.
The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act' makes it a crime to sell
any motor vehicle moving as, or which is a part of, or which consti-
tutes interstate commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen. In
Grimesly v. U. S.2 an indictment, drawn up under this act, charging
the sale of a motor vehicle with knowledge that it had been trans-
ferred in interstate commerce and theretofore stolen was held insuf-
ficient, on the ground that it was not alleged that the automobile was
moving in interstate commerce and that it did not further state that
the automobile had been stolen.
The Sixth amendment provides, that, "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right-to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. .. ." Congress, in order to limit the courts
in testing whether or not the accused has been sufficiently informed,
'As to fundamentals of the grand jury system, see 1 WIGmom, EvmENcF
(2nd ed. 1923) 20.
'When an indictment is found upon testimony, all of which is incom-
petent, or of witnesses, all of whom are disqualified, the bill will be quashed.
But where some of the testimony or some of the witnesses were incompetent,
the court will not go into the barren inquiry how far such testimony or wit-
nesses contributed to the finding of the bill," State v. Coates, supra note 3.
The opinion of the principal case quotes the same extract, and points out that
since the Coates case actually concerned only disqualified witnesses the court's
statement of the rule to include incompetent evidence was so much too broad.
But if it be granted that all of the evidence heard by the grand jury in a given
case is incompetent, where is a logical basis for the distinction?
141 Stat. 324 (1919) ; 18 U. S. C. A. §408 (1927).
50 F. (2d) 509 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
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has said, "No indictment ... shall be deemed insufficient nor the
trial affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in manner of
form only, which shall not tend to prejudice of defendant." a  Most
of the courts are liberal in this matter and consider the true test
whether or not the information enabled the accused to make a good
defense.4
In the principal case the majority view was that, for all the indict-
ment showed, the automobile might have come to rest in Florida long
before defendant sold it. They were of the opinion that the essential
element was that the car be moving in interstate commerce and that
the indictment showed only an offense against the laws of the state.
The same question was raised in Katz v. U. S.5 and the court there
said the defendants should not escape punishment because they sup-
posed that they were violating only a state and not a federal law.
The majority in the Grimesly Case were of the opinion that it should
be specifically stated that the car in question was stolen. Most of the
cases favor a more liberal view and hold it sufficient if it is alleged
that the accused knew the care to be stolen.0
As stated in the strong dissent the sole defense was that the de-
fendant did not know that the car in question was stolen, and the case
'N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927) §4623.
" Statute made it a crime to knowingly and fraudulently import liquor into
the United States; indictment charging defendant with "unlawfully and feloni-
ously" importing was held sufficient. Wishart v. United States, 29 F. (2d)
103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; indictment charging receipt and possession of goods
knowing the same to have been stolen from an interstate freight car was held
spfficient where the statute made it a crime to have in possession goods stolen
from an interstate freight car, Grandi v. United States, 262 Fed. 123 (C. C. A.
6th, 1920); Espionage Act (1918) 40 Stat. 553 (1918), 50 U. S. C. A. 33(1927) made it a crime against the United States to make seditious statements
with the intent to hinder the operations of the Army or the Navy, indictment
in Shilter v. United States, 257 Fed. 724 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) drawn under this
act charged defendant with making seditious statements and was held insuffi-
cient because there was nothing to connect defendant's acts directly or indirectly
with the Army or the Navy; Sonnenberg v. United States, 264 Fed. 327 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1920) a later case under the same act held it was not necessary that
the words be spoken to some one in service; where the indictment drawn up
under the statute prohibiting the use of the mails to defraud and merely
charged defendant with having devised a scheme to defraud, held insufficient
in United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 8 Sup. Ct. 571 (1888). By comparing
the dates of these cases we see that the modern courts are more liberal in their
views of the sufficiency of indictments.
'281 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).
'Isbell v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Wendell v.
United States, 34 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Brooks v. United States(1925), 276 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345, 69 L. ed. 699; Heglin v. United States,
27 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Abraham v. United States, 15 F. (2d)
911 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
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was tried exactly the same as if the indictment had been letter perfect
or exactly like it will be on new trial. The dissenting opinion is more
in keeping with modern liberal decisions.7
J. H. SEMBOWER.
Criminal Law-Tests of Legality of Searches and Seizures in
North Carolina and Federal Courts.
Four federal cases' decided within the past five months call atten-
tion to the conflict between the right of the state to make reasonable
searches and seizures and the individual right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Here are opposed the social need
that crime be repressed and the social need that law shall not be
flouted by the insolence of office.2
Search warrants were unknown to the common law and "crept in
by imperceptible practice." 3 The Fourth Amendment embodies an
old common law principle 4 of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and though it does not apply to the states,5
nevertheless all the states have included its equivalent in their consti-
tutions.6 The purpose of this protection, obviously, was not to afford
a shield to the guilty. That it should be so is an inescapable incident
to the preservation of the right to the people generally and affords a
challenge to the law enforcement machinery to solve and reduce this
result to a minimum.
If the situation is one where a lawful arrest may be made, then, it
is permissible to search the person and things under the control and
in the possession of the arrested person at the time of the arrest. 7
"AM. LAw INsT. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §159.
'Strom v. U. S., 50 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) ; U. S. v. Dean, 50 F.
(2d) 905 (D. Mass. 1931); U. S. v. Murray, 51 F. (2d) 516 (D. Md. 1931);
U. S. v. Ruffner, 51 F. (2d) 579 (D. Md. 1931).
' People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), 270 U. S. 657, 46
Sup. Ct. 353, 70 L. ed. 784 (1925) (certiorari denied).
'Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 2 Wils. K. B. 274 (1765).
"Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (C. B., 1763) ; Entick v. Carrington,
supra note 3.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65 L. ed. 1048, 13
A. L. R. 1159 (1921).
' N. C. CONST., art. 1, §15; Fraenkel, Concenting Searches and Seizwres
(1921) 34 HA~v. L. Rzv. 361.
" Strom v. U. S., supra note 1; Haverstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N. E.
625 (1925) ; People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923), 32 A. L.
R. 676 (1924) ; State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922) ; Hughes v.
State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588, 20 A. L. R. 639 (1922); State v. Deitz,
136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
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Arrest without a warrant has been sanctioned from the earliest times.8
It is permissible where reasonable grounds existed for belief that a
felony has been committed and where a breach of the peace was com-
mitted in the presence of the officer.0 Some jurisdictions have ex-
tended the latter to misdemeanors in general.10
When, however, a search becomes necessary to procure evidence
to justify the arrest a different question is presented. Thus where it
is a misdemeanor to carry concealed weapons the officer cannot arrest
a person in his presence unless the offense can be detected through
the senses." This has been carried over to the liquor cases.' 2
In Carroll v. U. S.' a the emphasis was not placed on the arrest but
the right to search was treated as independent. Probable cause as a
sufficient ground for search was there adopted regardless of whether
the act in question amounted to a felony or misdemeanor. The pro-
hibition is against unreasonable searches and seizures and if there is
probable cause then it would appear not to be within its scope.
This reversal of emphasis affords a possible justification for the
holding in a recent North Carolina case.' 4 Nevertheless, the prin-
ciple has not been expressly adopted, but rather the technical distinc-
tion between felonies and misdemeanors has been disregarded in
stressing the enforcement of the liquor laws. Thus arrests for mis-
demeanors have been held valid though not detected by the senses of
the officer and probable cause only existed. 15 Where liquor is being
transported in a vehicle, North Carolina, by statute, 6 demands more
than probable cause, specifically, actual sight or personal knowledge
acquired through the senses. This results in a nebulous distinction
between a man walking and one riding17 and fails to recognize the
* 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883) 189.
* 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 1889) 71.
" State v. Deitz, supra note 6; Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant (1924)
22 MICH. L. REv. 673, 703-709.
'Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535, 52 L. R. A. 751 (1901);
Hughes v. State, 2 Ga. App. 29, 58 S. E. 390 (1907). Contra: People v.
Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1922).
"Douglass v. State, 152 Ga. 379, 110 S. E. 168 (1921).
"267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. ed. 543, 39 A. L. R. 790 (1925);
(1927) 26 MIcH. L. REv. 827.
' State v. Simmons, 183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E. 591 (1922). (Officers sus-
pecting D of liquor violation followed him in house and opened suitcase,
found liquor and arrested D.)
"State v. Campbell, 182 N. C. 911, 110 S. E. 86 (1921).
" N. C. PuB. LAws (1923) c. 1, §6, N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §3411
(f) ; State v. Godette, 188 N. C. 497, 125 S. E. 24 (1924).
State v. Jenkins, 195 N. C. 747, 143 S. E. 538 (1928) ; (1928) 7 N. C. L.
Rav. 67.
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reasonable difference between a vehicle and a building which is ad-
hered to in the federal rule. North Carolina thus goes farther in
permitting arrests but not so far in permitting searches. If there is
no probable cause and mere suspicion alone, a fortiori the search is
illegal.18
A man's home is still his castle and belief, no matter how well
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling, furnishes
no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.' 9 Such
warrant cannot -be issued to secure evidentiary matter only20 and in
liquor cases cannot be secured by a federal officer for a bona fide res-
idence unless a commercial feature is involved. 21 This protection,
however, does not extend to woods and open fields at a distance from
the residence ;22 nor to unoccupied houses not within the curtilage ;23
nor to a bare licensee.2 4
The privilege to be free from unlawful searches and seizures is a
personal one and may be waived 25 but such waiver must appear by
clear and positive proof and not be open to question, for the courts
do not put the citizen in the position of either contesting the officer's
authority by force or waiving his constitutional privileges. 26 If the
defendant disclaims dominion over the place and property he cannot
question the validity of the search, two cases 27 hold, but a recent
" Batts v. State, 194 Ind. 609, 144 N. E. 23 (1924) ; Eiler v. State, 196 Ind.
562, 149 N. E. 62 (1925) ; State ex rel Houston v. De Herrodora, 192 N. C.
749, 136 S. E. 6 (1926).
" Agnello v. U. S., 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. ed. 145 (1925), 51
A. L. R. 409 (1927).
Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. ed. 647 (1921).
Staker v. U. S., 5 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) ; (1931) 5 CiN. L.
REv. 103.
' Hester v. U. S., 265 U. S. 57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445, 68 L. ed. 898 (1924);
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 33, 275 S. W. 369 (1925); (1927) 13 VA.
L. REG. (N. S.) 164.
' Robie v. State, 36 S. W. (2d) 175 (Tex. 1931). Contra: Welch v. State,
154 Tenn. 60, 289 S. W. 510 (1926).
' Duke v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 365, 256 S. W. 725 (1923). But see
Allen v. State, 161 Tenn. 71, 29 S. W. (2d) 247 (1930).
" Raine v. U. S., 299 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), 266 U. S. 611, 45 Sup.
Ct. 94, 69 L. ed. 467 (certiorai denied).
" Amos v. U. S., 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266, 65 L. ed. 654 (1920);
Dukes v. U. S., 275 Fed. 142 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921) ; U. S. v. Ruffner, mspra note
1; Coleman v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 139, 292 S. W. 771 (1927); State v.
Luna, 266 S. W. 755 (Mo. App. 1924) ; Hancock v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. App. 96,
248 Pac. 1115 (1926) ; cf. State ex rel. Muzzy v. Uotila, 71 Mont. 351, 229 Pac.
724 (1924). But cf. Wibmer v. State, 182 Wis. 303, 195 N. W. 936 (1923).
' McMillan v. U. S., 26 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Patterson v. U. S.,
31 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
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case 28 appears more consistent in that the government should not be
permitted to maintain that he is the owner for the purpose of convict-
ing him and not the owner for the purpose of searching.
The following rule is suggested as a solution to the conflict:
(1) where the object to be searched is a building there shall be no
searches without a warrant, except as incidental to a valid arrest ;29
(2) where the object is not a building searches shall be permitted on
probable cause. 30  HUGH BROWN CAMPBELL.
Equity-Injunctions-Powe'r to Enjoin an
Extraterritorial Nuisance.
In a case brought in the Supreme Court of the United States by
the state of New Jersey to enjoin the city of New York from dump-
ing garbage into the Atlantic Ocean and thereby fouling the New
Jersey beaches, one of the contentions of the defendant was that
since the actual dumping occurred on the high seas beyond the ter-
ritorial waters of the United States, the court had no jurisdiction.
The court held that having jurisdiction of the party defendant it
could in the exercise of its original equity jurisdiction, grant the
injunction.'
'U. S. v. Dean, supra note 1. This question is raised under the federal
rule as to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by an illegal search and
seizure. Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914) ;
Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. ed. 647 (1921) ; Burdeau
v. McDowell, supra note 5; State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927),
52 A. L. R. 463 (1928) ; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, loc. cit.
supra note 6; Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case (1925)
23 MIcH. L. REv. 748; Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtahwd Through
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 11; Fraenkel,
Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure (1928) 13 MINN. L.
REV. 1. It would not obstruct a conviction in states where the evidence is ad-
missible. People v. Defore, supra note 2; In re Siracusa, 125 Misc. Rep. 882,
212 N. Y. Supp. 400 (1925) ; 4 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§2183, 2184;
Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search] and Seizure (1922) 8
A. B. A. J. 479. North Carolina is probably in the latter group, though no
direct holding where motion made to suppress before trial. State v. Wallace,
162 N. C. 623, 78 S. E. 1 (1913), 36 ANN. CAs. 423 (1915) ; see State v. Fow-
ler, 172 N. C. 905, 914, 90 S. E. 408, 411 (1916) ; State v. Simmons, supra note
14, at 686, 110 S. E. at 592.
' U. S. v. Borkowski, 268 Fed. 408 (S. D. Ohio 1920) ; Miller v. U. S., 9 F.
(2d) 382 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); State v. Thomas, 105 W. Va. 346, 143 S. E. 88
(1928) ; State v. Vandetta, 108 W. V. 277, 150 S. E. 736 (1929) ; cf. Staker v.
U. S., supra note 21; Schroeder v. U. S., 14 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926),
(1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 300, 304; (1927) 26 MIcH. L. RV. 86; see Adair v.
Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 Pac. 853, 856 (1922).
-' U. S. v. Murray, vipra note 1.
State of New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U. S. 473, 51 Sup. Ct. 519
(1931).
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The opinion, written by Mr. Justice Butler, cites only four cases
as sustaining the power of the court. Of these, three involved title
to foreign land and the fourth an attempt to evade the insolvency laws
of the forum.2
In the instant case, while the injury was caused by an act com-
pleted on the high seas, that act began in the United States. The
barges bearing the noxious material were loaded at the docks in New
York City and hauled out to sea where it was dumped and allowed to
float directly onto the beaches of New Jersey. Thus, an act started
within the jurisdiction of the court proximately caused an injury
within the same jurisdiction. Therefore it would hardly seem neces-
sary to invoke the court's power to enjoin a foreign tort, its authority
to issue injunctions against local nuisances being ample to care for
the entire situation.
But even if it is assumed that the complaint here is concerned only
with the tort committed outside the continental United States, four
lines of decisions were available to support the decree issued by the
court. (1) Injunction against a foreign tort, defendant being ordered
by the terms of the decree to refrain from a positive act.3 Thus the
New York Courts ordered a railway company to stop switching cars
on the Canadian end of the international bridge across the Niagara
2 Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 3 L. ed. 181 (1810) (Agent to locate a
warrant took for himself title to land that should have surveyed for his prin-
cipal. The court ordered him to convey to his principal though the land lay
in another state) ; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 3 Sup. Ct. 586, 28 L. ed.
101 (1884) (suit for the removal of cloud upon title to land in another state.
Service of summons by publication only. Held: Decree was necessarily in
personam in this case and so cannot operate as a bar to suit for the land, be-
cause the court below never had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant) ;
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 56 L. ed. 570
(1912) (suit to enjoin the Secretary of War from bringing threatened crim-
inal prosecution against a riparian owner for reclamation and occupation of
land beyond the harbor limits of Pittsburgh was properly brought in a court
of the District of Columbia having jurisdiction of the person of the defend-
ant) ; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 38 L. ed. 538 (1890)
(defendant may be enjoined from bringing suit in another state in an effort
to evade the insolvency law of his own state and defraud other credtors of the
bankrupt).
'Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller and Lux, 218 U. S. 258, 31 Sup. Ct.
77, 54 L. ed. 1032 (1910) (federal court in Nevada may enjoin defendant
from diverting an excessive amount of water from an interstate stream though
the diversion occurred in another state); Great Falls Manufacturing Co. v.
Worster, 23 N. H. 462 (1857) (defendant ordered not to go into an adjoining
state to dynamite one end of an interstate dam) ; Niagara Falls International
Bridge Co. v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada, 241 N. Y. 85, 148 N. E.
797 (1925) ; Lord Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 M. & K. 104 (1854) (defendant
not to sue in foreign jurisdiction for collection of a bill of exchange given for
a gambling debt).
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River because such use injured the whole bridge, a part of which was
in New York. (2) Discontinuance of a foreign nuisance, when com-
pliance with the decree will necessitate affirmative action.4 In the
Salton Sea Cases the defendant was maintaining dams in Mexico
which flowed water from the Colorado River onto the plaintiff's land
and into the Salton Sea in California. The federal court in California
enjoined the continuance of the cause of the injury, which decree was
the equivalent of an order to go into Mexico and take immediate
affirmative steps to remedy the situation. (3) Cases in which the
court has definitely ordered the defendant to perform some positive
act in a foreign jurisdiction,5 as, to perform a contract for the
delivery of a stallion, to install meters on irrigation ditches, or,
specifically to perform a contract for laying off the boundaries of a
province on another continent. (4) Injunction against going into a
foreign jurisdiction to commit a tort.6
Therefore although the result of the present case is sound, it is
respectfully submitted that the opinion did not adequately analyze the
problem or the law applicable. The case is unique in being free
from the usual objection that the court is interfering with another
sovereign, no nation having authority over the point of dumping.7
ALLEN LANGSTON.
Evidence-The Hearsay Rule-Confession of Third Party as
Admission Against Penal Interest.
Defendant was indicted for murder. He offered a witness to
prove that a third party who was no longer available as a witness had
'Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910); Note (1910) 41
HAuv. L. REv. 390; Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26
HARv. L. REv. 193, 283.
'Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water
Co., 245 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917) ; Madden v. Rosseter, 114 Misc. 416, 187
N. Y. Supp. 462 (1921); Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444 (1750);
Contra: Miss. & Mo. Ry. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black 485, 17 L. ed. 311 (1862);
Port Royal Railway Co. v. Hammond, 58 Ga. 523 (1877).
'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 137 Fed.
435 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1905) (a federal court having the parties before it will
enjoin defendant from going into another state or district and there injuring
the plaintiff's property) ; Schmaltz v. York Manufacturing Co., 204 Pa. St. 1,
53 At. 522 (1902) (defendant ordered not to go into New York and remove an
ice machine from a brewery) ; Kempson v. Kempson, 61 N. J. Eq. 303, 48 Atl.
244 (1901) ; Id. 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 360 (1902) (equity may order a de-
fendant not to go into another state to procure a divorce) ; French v. Maguire,
55 How. Pr. 471 (1878) (defendant in New York ordered by a court of that
state not to produce a certain play in San Francisco).
" JEssUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WAMrS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION.
Chapter II and III.
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confessed committing the crime. This evidence was rejected. Held:
on appeal that the evidence was properly rejected as hearsay.1
The decision is supported by the North Carolina decisions, 2 as
well as by a great majority of the decisions of other jurisdictions.3
There can be no doubt but that the evidence is hearsay. Therefore if
such evidence is to be admitted it must necessarily be done under an
exception to the hearsay rule, which rule excludes extrajudicial dec-
larations not made under oath and subject to cross examination. In
this state extrajudicial declarations made against the pecuniary and
proprietary interests of the declarant, if he is dead, are admitted as
an exception to the hearsay rule.4 The court regards such evidence
as especially trustworthy due to the fact that it in no way serves the
declarant, but is made in contradiction to his interests. There seems
to be no valid reason why the limitation of the exception should not
be extended to include declarations against penal interests. The argu-
ment has been advanced that the accused could exonerate himself by
procuring false testimony but all evidence is open to the same abuse.
'State v. Stephen English, 201 N. C. 295, 159 S. E. 318 (1931).
2 State v. May, 15 N. C. 328 (1833) ; State v. Duncan, 28 N. C. 236 (1846);
State v. White, 68 N. C. 158 (1872) ; State v. Gee, 92 N. C. 756 (1884) ; State
v. Jones, 80 N. C. 415 (1878) ; State v. Boon, 80 N. C. 461 (1878) State v.
Hayes, 71 N. C. 79 (1874) ; State v. Lane, 166 N. C. 333, 81 S. E. 620 (1914);
State v. Church, 192 N. C. 658, 135 S. E. 769 (1926).
'Beach v. State, 138 Ga. 265, 75 S. E. 139 (1912) ; Kennedy v. State, 9 Ga.
App. 219, 70 S. E. 986 (1911) ; Foster v. State, 92 Miss. 257, 45 So. 859 (1908) ;
State v. Bailey, 74 Kan. 873, 87 Pac. 189 (1906) ; State v. Jones, 127 La. 694,
53 So. 959 (1911) . State vr. Jennings, 48 Ore. 483, 87 Pac. 524 (1906) ; Siple
v. State, 154 Ind. 647, 57 N. E. 544 (1900) ; Selby v. State, 25 Ky. Law Rep.
2209, 80 S. W. 221 (1904) ; State v. Young, 107 La. 618, 31 So. 993 (1901) ;
State v. Levy, 90 Mo. App. 643 (1901) ; Cox v. State, 160 Tenn. 221, 22 S. W.
(2d) 225 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Sacco, 259 Mass. 126, 156 N. E. 57 (1927) ;
Moya v. People, 79 Colo. 104, 244 Pac. 69 (1926) ; Green v. State, 153 Ga. 215,
111 S. E. 916 (1922); Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N. E.
209 (1918); Factor v. State, 28 Okla, Cr. R. 78, 229 Pac. 154 (1924); Mc-
C6slin v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 58, 256 S. W. 295 (1923), Mays v. State, 72
Neb. 723, 101 N. W. 979 (1904) ; State v. Totten, 72 Vt. 73, 47 Atl. 105 (1899) ;
State v. Hunter, 18 Wash. 670, 52 Pac. 247 (1898) ; Buel v. State, 104 Wis.
132, 80 N. W. 78 (1899) ; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 33 Sup.
Ct. 449, 57 L. ed. 820 (1913) ; Childs v. State, 55 Ala. 25 (1876) ; People v.
Zimmerman, 65 Cal. 307, 4 Pac. 20 (1884) ; State v. Porter, 74 Iowa 623, 38
N. W. 514 (1888).
'Smith v. Moore, 142 N. C. 277, 55 S. E. 275 (1906) ; Peace v. Jenkins, 32
N. C. 355 (1849) ; Brantley v. Marshbourn, 166 N. C. 527, 82 S. E. 959 (1914) ;
Ratclift v. Ratclift, 131 N. C. 425, 42 S. E. 887 (1902) ; Dill-Cramer-Truitt
Corp. v. Downs, 201 N. C. 478, 160 S. E. 492 (1931).
The North Carolina decisions require that the declarant be dead at the
time the declarations are offered as evidence. It would seem that any other
form of unavailability should serve equally as well.
A distinction is made between declarations against interest and admissions.
2 WIGMORE, EVlDmEcE (2d. ed. 1923) §1048.
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Although most jurisdictions still follow the rule in the principal
case it has been severely criticized. 5 Justice Brogden recognizes the
injustice of the rule as is manifest by his apologetic reason for the
decision. 6 It would seem that there should be no hesitancy in over-
ruling an arbitrary rule of law, based on erroneous reasoning, created
as a historical accident, and so unjust as to be termed barbarous by so
great a writer as Mr. Wigmore and roundly assailed by so eminent a
jurist as Judge Holmes.
DALLACE McLENNAN.
juries-Challenge for Racial Prejudice.
A negro was tried and convicted of the murder of a -white man.
Upon the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, the trial judge
overruled the defendant's request that a question relative to racial
prejudice be propounded to each and every juror. Held, the ruling
of the trial court was erroneous and the judgment of conviction must
be reversed.'
The propriety of such an inquiry to determine a disqualifying
state of a juror's mind has been generally recognized with reference
to the negro race,2 other races,8 and the defendant's nationality.4
'2 WIGmORE, EviDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §§1476, 1477; Donelly v. United
States, supra note 4, Judge Holmes' dissenting opinion.
"The writer of this opinion speaking for himself strings with the minority
but it is the duty of the trial judge to apply the law as it is written." If this
is true can this rule ever be changed by judicial decision?
'Aldridge v. U. S., 283 U. S. 308, 51 S. Ct. 470, 75 L. ed. 628, 73 A. L. R.
1203 (1931) [reversing 47 F. (2d) 407 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1931)].
2 Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75 (1891) ; Hill v.
State, 112 Miss. 260, 72 So. 1003 (1916); State v. McAfee, 64 N. C. 339(1870) ; Fendrick v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 147, 45 S. W. 589 (1898) ; State V.
Sanders, 103 S. C. 216, 88 S. E. 10 (1916) ; People v. Decker, 157 N. Y. 186,
51 N. E. 1018 (1898); State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 S. W. 519 (1905);
Johnson v. State, 88 Neb. 565, 130 N. W. 282, ANN. CAS. 1912B 965 (1911) ;
Bass v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 186, 127 S. W. 1020 (1910) ; Moore v. State, 52
Tex. Cr. R. 336, 107 S. W. 540 (1907) ; State v. Casey, 44 La. Ann. 969, 11
So. 583 (1892) ; Hamlin v. State, 101 Ark. 257, 142 S. W. 151 (1911) ; Cavitt
v. State, 15 Tex. App. 190 (1883); Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corpor-
ation, 40 S. W. (2d) 356 (Ky. 1931) ; Strong v. State, 85 Ark. 536, 109 S. W.
536, 14 ANN. CAS. 229 (1908) ; Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 432 (1877). But
see Crawford v. U. S., 59 App. D. C. 356, 41 F. (2d) 979 (1930).
'Horst v. Silverman, 20 Wash. 233, 55 Pac. 52, 72 Am. St. Rep. 97 (1898)(Jews) ; Potter v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 216 S. W. 886 (1919) (Jews);
People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102 (1880) (Chinese).
"State v. Stafford, 89 W. Va. 301, 109 S. E. .326 (1921) (Italian) ; People
v. Potigan, 69 Cal. App. 257, 231 Pac. 593 (1924) (Armenian) ; State v.
Guidice, 170 Iowa 731, 153 N. W. 336, ANN. CAS. 1917C 1160 (1915) (Ital-
ian); People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, (1885) ("foreigners") ; cf. Watson v.
Whitney, 23 Cal. 375 (1863) "squatters").
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The question usually assumes the form of a specific interrogatory
with the purpose of determining the existence of a prejudice which
will influence the juror's verdict, as contrasted with a mere prefer-
ence for one's own race or nationality to that of the defendant's.5
The question is, therefore, consistent with other questions pro-
pounded to jurors; such as, whether they are members of an organ-
ization or association which is interested in the prosecution of the par-
ticular defendant ;6 or whether the juror is a stockholder in a corpor-
ation which is a party to the suit ;7 or whether the juror is an employee
of the defendant ;8 or whether the juror's opinion of the death penalty
will influence his verdict in a prosecution for a capital crime.9 It is
generally held that affirmative answers to such questions constitute
sufficient grounds for challenges for cause.' 0
Where the juror admits the existence of a prejudice against the
defendant's race, but states that he can render a fair verdict upon
the law and evidence, he is usually held competent for jury service."
Such rulings may be questioned on the ground that the juror is
merely expressing a belief in his own ability to render an impartial
verdict regardless of his prejudice.12
A person, under the constitution and laws of the United States,
is entitled to a fair and impartial trial. If a prospective juror
possesses a racial prejudice that would prevent his giving a fair and
impartial verdict, he is unfit to sit in the jury box. How, then, is it
'Pinder v. State; Hill v. State; Fendrick v. State; Strong v. State; Cavitt
v. State, all supra note 2.
'State v. Sultan, 142 N. C. 569, 54 S. E. 1002 9 ANN. CAs. 310, n. 312(1906) ; Bethel v. State, 162 Ark. 76, 257 S. W. 740, 31 A. L. R. 402, n. 411
(1924). But mere membership in an organization or association whose policies
are adverse to the defendant, but which is not actively interested in the prosecu-
tion of the defendant, does not in itself constitute disqualification.
'Murchison National Bank v. Dunn Oil Mills Co., 150 N. C. 683, 64 S. E.
883 (1909) ; Walters v. Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 388, 81 S. E. 453 (1914) ; Note
(1912) 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 978; Note (1917) 16 R. C. L. 274.
'Oliphant v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 171 N. C. 303, 84 S. E. 425
(1916) ; Blevin v. Cotton Mills, 150 N. C. 493, 64 S. E. 428 (1909) ; Norris v.
Mills, 154 N. C. 474, 70 S. E. 949 (1911); Hufnagle v. Delaware & Hudson
Co., 227 Pa. 476, 76 Atl. 205, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 982 (1910).
'State v. Vick, 132 N. C. 995, 43 S. E. 626 (1903) ; Grant v. State, 67 Tex.
Cr. R. 155, 148 S. W. 760, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 428 (1912) ; Demato v. People,
49 Colo. 147, 111 Pac. 703, 35 L. R. A. (N. S) 621 (1910) ; Johnson v. State,
88 Neb. 565, 130 N. W. 282, ANN. CAs. 1912B 965 (1911); Note (1917) 16
R. C. L. 271.
See note 3-10, supra.
"State v. Brown; Johnson v. State; Bass v. State; Moore v. State; Ham-
in v. State; Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corporation, all supra note 3.
State v. Guidice, supra note 5.
" State v. Brooks, 57 Mont. 480, 188 Pac. 942 (1920).
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possible to ascertain whether he is prejudiced or not, unless such
questions are propounded to him?13 It would seem that the court in
the instant case has made satisfactory answer to this question.
JAMES 0. MooRE.
Libel and Slander-Liability of Estate for Libel in Will.
The will of testatrix contained an implication that her grandson
was illegitimate. The grandson sued the estate for libel and recovery
was allowed.1 The appellate court, in conscious disregard of com-
mon law principles, based its decision on the theory that everyone is
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act, and that since
testatrix deliberately inserted the defamatory statement in her will,
knowing it would be published, her estate should be held liable. No
attempt was made to place liability on the executor, as the legal re-
quirement that the will be probated 2 makes the act privileged.8
Libel and slander are personal actions, and are abated by the
death of the tortfeasor. 4  The Georgia court, however, evades this
difficulty by holding that as the cause of action did not accrue until
the probate of the will, which was after the death of the testatrix, it
was not abated by her death.
Only two other decisions have been found involving the same
question and both these cases allowed recovery on the theory that
the executor was the agent of the testator and therefore the estate
was liable.5 This theory has been severely criticized. 6 There can
be no agency where no principal exists.7 If an agency is created be-
fore death, death will ordinarily revoke the agency,8 and it has been
held that death cannot create an agency.9 The Georgia court men-
People v. Reyes, supra note 5.
'Hendricks v. Citizens' & Southern Nat. Bank, 158 S. E. 915 (Ga. 1931).
'GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §3868.
'2 COOLEY, THE LAW OF ToRTs (3rd ed. 1906) 1503.
'Acto personalis inoritur cur persona.
Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 733 (1901) ; Harris v. Nashville Trust
Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 897, ANN. CAs. 1914C,
885 (1914).
° (1914) 12 Micr. L. REv. 489; (1914) 23 YALE L. J. 534; (1914) 62 U. PA.
L. REv. 643.
'1 MECHEM, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2nd. ed. 1914) §26, n. 2.8 Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs., 8 Wheaton 174 (1823); 1 MECHEM, THE
LAW OF AGENCY (2nd ed. 1914) §§651, 652, 655. The two exceptions to this
rule-where the agency is coupled with an interest in the subject matter, and
when the revocation would involve the agent in liability to third parties-
obviously do not apply.
'Moore v. Weston, 13 N. D. 574, 102 N. W. 163 (1904).
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tions but does not base its holding on this theory, preferring to
indulge in a little judicial legislation in order to give plaintiff relief.
Admitting that plaintiff has suffered a wrong for which he should
have a remedy, still it seems unwise to entirely disregard common
law principles. In the first place, the probate of the will, which is
the basis of plaintiff's suit, is required by statute,1 0 and no tort can
be predicated upon an act which is required by law, for in legal con-
templation there can be no wrong if the act complained of is legal."
Secondly, permitting plaintiff to recover seems to violate the rule that
an estate can only be held for debts owed by the testator at his
death. 12 Thirdly, it has been suggested 13 that if the rule of the in-
stant case is to prevail, it might enable the testator to avoid certain
statutes14 based on public policy forbidding the devising of money
above a certain proportion of the estate to certain classes, as mis-
tresses and illegitimates. The testator could, in such case, by simply
inserting any libellous statement in his will, allow them to obtain a
larger portion of his estate. Fourthly, even if recovery is allowed,
it is obvious that it would be a tax not on the testator or his property
but on the inheritance, as the property vests in the heirs as of the
testator's death.15 The common law conceives of death as extin-
guishing preExisting tort liability, a fortiori the impossibility of affix-
ing liability for a tort initiated by a testator but accruing only after
his death.
In England such a suit has never arisen. The English practice is
to expunge from a will defamatory matter which is not dispositive.16
The American courts have been reluctant to adopt this view. Only
one case has been found where a scandalous clause was stricken from
probate.' 7 Several cases hold that the court has no authority to
strike out any part of a will.' 8 In view of the American holdings it
1
'GA. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1926), supra note 2.
2 CooLEY, THE LAW OF ToRTs, supra note 3.
Eustace v. Jahns, 38 Cal. 1, 23 (1869) ; 2 WnizAms oN ExEcuToRs (4th
ed. 1855) §§1470, 1471.(1914) 23 YALE L. J., supra note 6 at 538.
S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922) §5217; LA. REV. Crv. CODE (Saunders, 2nd
ed. 1920) §1470.
GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §3831.
"GA tLr, LmEL AND SLANDER (2nd ed. 1929) 458, n. 15; 2 REFIEMD, THE
LAW OF Wns (3rd ed. 1866) 43; see In the Goods of Honywood, L. R. 2
P. & D. 251, 252 (1871).
'itn re Bomar's Will, 27 Abb. N. C. 425, 44 N. Y. S. R. 304, 18 N. Y.
Supp. 214 (1892).
'Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98, 85 Am. St. Rep. 145
(1900) ; In re Pforr's Estate, 144 Cal. 121, 77 Pac. 825 (1904) ; In re Meyer,
72 Misc. 566, 131 N. Y. Supp. 27 (1911).
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seems desirable for the legislature to give to the probate court author-
ity to expunge from a will any libellous matter which is not strictly
dispositive. This solution, in accord with the time-proven English
practice, tends to preserve common law principles and at the same
time prevents injurious publication.
ROBERT A. Hovis.
Malicious Prosecution-Probable Cause as Question for Judge
or Jury-Authority of Agent to Institute Prosecution
Under Bad Check Law.
In the recent case of Dickerson v. Atlantic Refining Co.,' the
plaintiff gave an agent of the defendant company a check in payment
for certain goods. Three hours later, and before presentation of the
check to the drawee bank, the plaintiff was arrested on a warrant
sworn out by said agent charging him with uttering a worthless
check. Due to a subsequent deposit, the check was paid when pre-
sented by the general manager of the local branch of the defendant
corporation. The case against the plaintiff was ",nol. pros'd. with
leave," and this action for malicious prosecution was then instituted
against the defendant company and its agents. It was held that a
prosecution for uttering a worthless check, instituted chiefly to col-
lect a debt and before presentation, was prima facie evidence that
the prosecution was without probable cause, and that the evidence
was sufficient to take the case to the jury.
Although some of the earlier decisions are to the effect that prob-
able cause is a question to be determined by the jury,2 the more
numerous and later cases establish the principle that it is a question
of law to be determined by the court.3 The jury are to find the facts
1201 N. C. 90, 159 S. E. 446 (1931).
'Thurber v. Building and Loan Ass'n., 118 N. C. 129, 24 S. E. 730 (1896);
R. R. v. Hardware Co., 143 N. C. 54, 55 S. E. 422 (1906).
Overton v. Combs, 182 N. C. 4, 108 S. E. 357 (1921); Humphries v. Ed-
wards, 164 N. C. 154, 80 S. E. 165 (1914) (when the facts are admitted or
established, the question of probable cause is one of law) ; Bowen v. Pollard and
Co., 173 N. C. 129, 91 S. E. 711 (1921) (is a question of law to be decided by
the court upon the facts as they may be found by the jury) ; Tyler v. Mahoney,
166 N. C. 509, 82 S. E. 870 (1917) (a mixed question of law and fact) ; see
Jones v. R. R., 125 N. C. 227, 229, 34 S. E. 398, 399 (1899).
Despite this fact many cases state that a criminal prosecution for the purpose
of collecting a debt is prima facie evidence of lack of probable cause. Mc-
Donald v. Schroeder, 214 Pa. 411. 63 At. 1024, 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 701, 6 ANN.
CAs. 506 (1906) ; Wenger v. Philips, 195 Pa. 214, 45 Atl. 27, 78 Am. St. Rep.
810 (1900) (is not conclusive in establishing want of probable cause, but is
prima facie evidence).
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and the judge is to instruct them hypothetically as to the existence
or non-existence of probable cause under the different views that
might be taken of the evidence. A rule that certain facts establish a
prima facie case of probable cause and a rule that the court deter-
mines the question cannot, in logic or practice, both exist at the same
time. The former requires a permissive instruction ;4 the latter, a
mandatory one. The instant holding reversing a nonsuit with in-
structions to submit the question of probable cause to the jury is
therefore an effectual, though inarticulate, repudiation of the estab-
lished rule.5
Under our "Bad Check Law" was the defendant justified in hav-
ing the plaintiff arrested without having presented the check to the
bank for payment? No general rule can be laid down due to the
diversity in form of the statutes in the different states ;7 but the
majority holding under the more recent statutes seems to be that the
giving of a check does not of itself represent that the drawer has with
the drawee bank sufficient funds out of which it will be paid, but
simply that the check will be paid in the ordinary course of business.8
In construing the North Carolina statute, the Supreme Court seems
In Hotel Supply Co. v. Reid, 16 Ala. App. 563, 80 So. 137 (1918) it was
held an abuse of criminal process.
""Of course, a prima facie showing does not necessarily mean that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover. It is sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and
it is for the jurors to say whether or not the crucial and necessary facts have
been established. We express no opinion as to the weight of the evidence, other
than its prima facie character, which means only that it is legally sufficient to
carry the case to the jury and to warrant a recovery, nothing else appearing.
It neither insures nor compels a recovery, however." Dickerson v. Refining
Co., 201 N. C. 90, 96, 159 S. E. 446, 450 (1931).
'Of course, the ruling of nonsuit might have been reversed on the ground
that the plaintiff's evidence, taken as true under the motion for nonsuit, showed
want of probable cause as a matter of law. That is, it might be established as
a rule of substantive law that a prosecution under the "Bad Check Law" insti-
tuted either before presentation or for a collateral purpose, and not to vindicate
public justice, is want of probable cause as a matter of law. But the theory of
reversal here is solely that the case should have gone to the jury.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §4283(a). It shall be unlawful for any
person ... to draw, make, utter or issue and deliver to another, any check or
draft ... knowing at the time of making, drawing, uttering, issuing, and de-
livering . . .that the maker or drawer thereof has not sufficient funds on
deposit in or credit with the bank ... with which to pay the same upon
presentation.
' Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 344, and Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 380.
'Maxey v. State, 85 Ark. 499, 108 S. W. 1135 (1908) ; Arrington v. State,
296 S. W. 568, Tex. Cr. App. (1927), in which the defendant was held not
guilty of uttering a worthless check, although he had given a check knowing
that he did not have sufficient funds on deposit with which to pay the same.
Before the check could have been presented he paid a part and promised pay-
ment of the balance. See (1927) 14 VA. L. REv. 134.
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to indicate that presentation of the check to the drawee bank is nec-
essary before the drawer can be convicted under the act.9 The statute
makes no reference to posL-dated checks; but it has been held that a
post-datdd check is not a representation that the drawer has funds for
payment upon presentation, and the maker is not guilty of uttering
a worthless check.10 Even though it were ascertained by the payee
that the maker of the check did not have sufficient funds on deposit
at the time of the drawing, there should be a presentation of the
check to the drawee bank, before criminal proceedings are instituted
by the payee, to avoid liability for malicious prosecution or false
arrest. 1
When an agent is acting within the scope of his employment, a
prosecution undertaken for the purpose of furthering the master's
business would, if unfounded, impose liability upon the master. 12 As
a general rule it appears that general managers and agents employed
for collection purposes are acting within their authority when insti-
tuting proceedings against anyone uttering a worthless check payable
to the master.' 3 If such prosecution is instituted without probable
cause, for the purpose of collecting a debt due the employer, then the
'Stacy, C. J., in State v. Crawford, 198 N. C. 522, 152 S. E. 504 (1930),
states that "our statute is specifically directed against the issuance of checks or
drafts on any bank or depository when the maker or drawer thereof has not
sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank or depository with which
to pay the same upon presentation."
In State v. Yarboro, 194 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 216 (1927), our court passed
on the constitutionality of and construed the statute. Note (1927) 6 N. C. L.
REv. 300.
"0 State v. Crawford, supra note 5. Contra: State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588,
207 Pac. 838 (1922) ; State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 390, 226 Pac. 758 (1924);
People v. Westerdahl, 316 Ill. 86, 146 N. E. 737 (1925).
Statutes against obtaining property by false pretenses do not include post-
dated checks. State v. Ferris, 171 Ind. 562, 86 N. E. 993 (1909) ; (1928) 34
W. VA. L. Q. 207.
'If the prosecution is instituted before presentation of the check it should
be lack of probable cause and evidence of malice, if the check is paid when
presented. This was in effect held in Dickerson v. Atl. Ref. Co., supra note 1;
supra note 5.
If there is an agreement to hold a check and then a criminal prosecution is
instituted, it is evidence of malice, and also of lack of probable cause. Aldana
v. Tarazon, 15 S. W. (2d) 678, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Turner v. Brenner, 138
Va. 232, 121 S. E. 510 (1924).
=Jackson v. Amer. Tel. and Telegrdph Co., 139 N. C. 347, 51 S. E. 1015, 70
L. R. A. 738 (1905) ; Kelly v. Shoe Co., 190 N. C. 406, 130 S. E. 32 (1925) ;(but if the agent exceeds his authority the master is not liable) Buttery v.
Wilhite, 208 Ala. 573, 94 So. 585 (1922).
, Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 241 Pac. 309 (1925); Hostettler v.
Carter, 73 Okla. 125, 175 Pac. 244 (1918); Gorman-Gammill Seed and Dairy
Co. v. Morton, 203 Ala. 530, 84 So. 766 (1919).
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principal may be liable for malicious prosecution or false arrest.1 4
It was recently held that if an agent is expressly forbidden to accept
checks except at his own risk, and he then procures the arrest of a
person for cashing a worthless check, the employer is not responsible,
unless there is a subsequent ratification of the act of the agent.1 5
To avoid liability for a malicious prosecution the owner of a busi-
ness enterprise should forbid its agents to institute proceedings under
the Worthless Check Act, until the check has been presented and
returned from the bank ;16 or else, to vindicate public justice and not
merely to collect a debt, make a full and fair disclosure of the facts
to a reliable attorney before commencing the prosecution ;17 or so
limit the authority of the agent that he will be acting outside the
scope of his employment if he institutes criminal proceedings t6 en-
force payment of a check.' 8
A. T. ALLEN, JR.
* Hotel Supply Co. v. Reid, supra note 3; Hostettler v. Carter; Sweatman
v. Linton, both upra note 13.
If there is probable cause for the arrest, and no evidence of malice on the
part of the agent, the master is not liable. Genovesse v. Piggly Wiggly, 32
S. W. (2d) 379, Tex. Civ. App. (1930).
' Lamm v. Charles Stores Co., 201 N. C. 134, 159 S. E. 444 (1931), in which
the store manager's arrest of the plaintiff on a charge of cashing a worthless
check was held to be an unauthorized act. There were written instructions to
the store manager in the following words: "If a manager cashes a personal
check, it is his own responsibility and he will positively be -held responsible."
There was no evidence of ratification of the act of the agent and the master
was not held liable for the false imprisonment.
Counsel in this case seems to have overlooked the rule of Price v. Neal, that
the loss on the forged check should have been borne by the drawee bank. Bank
v. Trust Co., 168 N. C. 605, 85 S. E. 5, L. R. A. 1915 D 1138 (1915).
Whether the agent had authority to take checks was not decided, but the fact
that the store, manager did take checks and that this was known by the em-
ployer, would seem to imply such authority. Even though the manager was
acting within the scope of his employment in accepting checks in payment would
not necessarily imply that he had the further authority to prosecute, since he
accepted the checks at his own risk, and there could be no benefit to the prin-
cipal. Whereas, in Dickerson v. Refining Co., supra note 1, the agents insti-
tuted the proceedings to collect a debt due the principal, and whether they were
within the scope of their authority, or whether there was a ratification of their
act, was held for the jury to determine. You must look to the facts in each
particular case. There was such a difference in the facts to the two cases as tojustify the different conclusions reached.
"s Dickerson v. Atl. Refining Co., supra note 1.
' The advice of counsel, given in good faith on a full and fair statement of
all the facts, is a defense in an action for malicious prosecution. Moser v.
Fable, 164 Ky. 517, 175 S. W. 997 (1915) ; J. B. Colt Co. v. Grubbs, 206 Ky.
809, 268 S. W. 817 (1925) ; Downing v. Stone, 152 N. C. 525, 68 S. E. 9, 136
Am. St. Rep. 841, 21 ANN. CAs. 753 (1910) (not a complete defense, but
evidence to be submitted to the jury on the issue of probable cause as well as
the issue of malice).
'Lamm v. Charles Stores Co., supra note 15.
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Practise and Procedure-Reading Dissenting Opinion in
Argument to Jury as Cause of Reversal.
In a personal injury action,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court,
with two judges dissenting, recently held that it was not permissible
for an attorney to read to the jury a dissenting opinion of the late
Chief Justice Clark of that court; and remanded the case for a new
trial. The court expressed the view that a dissenting opinion cannot
be classified either as a fact or as the law applicable to the facts, but
that it is in the same category as newspaper editorials, magazine
articles, pamphlets and "other writings which have not received the
judicial sanction of a court."
A majority of the courts condemn the reading of law to the jury
in civil cases.2 The basis of this rule is that the determination of the
law applicable is not within the province of the jury and that argu-
ment by counsel could only be confusing, leading to diversity and
uncertainty in the administration of justice. Thus the Supreme Court
of Illinois in a recent case3 held a statute making juries in criminal
cases judges of the law and the facts, unconstittitional. 4
In North Carolina, by statute,5 "the whole case as well of law as
of fact may be argued to the jury." Although its policy has not been
openly questioned, the broad language of the statute has been sub-
jected to the following judicially imposed limitations: counsel may
read the facts in an adjudicated case,8 but cannot comment upon them
as being similar to the facts in the case at bar ;7 counsel may not detail
'Conn v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 201 N. C. 157, 159 S. E. 331
(1931).
'Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald, 63 Fed. 238, 26 L. R. A. 531 (C. C. A. 2d,
1894) ; Richmond's Appeal, 59 Conn. 226, 21 A. M. St. Rep. 85 (1890) ; HYATT
ON TRIALS, (1924) §494.
' People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N. E. 400 (1931) ; Note (1931), 17 A. B.
A. J. 209.
'The grant of "judicial power" to department created therefor is exclusive
and exhausts the entire power. And constitution retaining right of trial by
jury, as "heretofore" enjoyed, did not refer to modifications in procedure by
statute but related to past; recourse must be had to English common law to
determine true meaning; under common law juries could not decide questions of
law, but only applied to facts, law stated by. the court. People v. Bruner, Supra
note 3.
'N. C. ANN CODE, Michie (1927) §203 (passed in 1844).
" Such facts are not read as evidence, but as illustrations of legal propositions
involved. Horah v. Knox, 87 N. C. 483 (1882).
" "The exhortation is implied, if not expressed, 'to go thou and do likewise."
Hyatt loc. cit., supra note 2. Horah v. Knox, mrpra note 6; State v. Powell,
94 N. C. 965 (1896). See also McINTosH, N. C. PrnAc. & PRo., 620.
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facts delivered on an appeal of a former trial in the same cause.8 But
the privilege of arguing the point of law involved is not denied.9
The instant case for the first time in England or America raises
the question as to the effect of reading a dissenting opinion to the
jury. Conceivably, a dissenting opinion may be classified under one
of three distinct heads: (1) It may be based upon the same rule of
law as relied upon by the majority, and yet arrive at a different con-
clusion, through another application to the facts.10 (2) It may state
a different rule of law. (3) It may conclude there is no such rule as
laid down in the decision of the court.1 Apparently, however, these
and other possible distinctions between different types of dissenting
opinions would be without significance under the decision of the
majority in the principal case. For one might guess that the Court
feels that the statute goes far enough in permitting even majority
opinion to become part of the jury's raw material. Or perhaps the
Court felt that a dissenting opinion by a judge properly eulogized 12
as one of "our great chief justices" might tend to weaken a sub-
sequent instruction given by a less famous presiding judge.
'State v. Smallwood, 78 N. C. 560 (1878) ; McIxTosH ro cit. supra note 7;
Gray v. Little, 127 N. C. 304, 37 S. E. 270 (1900).
'Forbes v. Harrison, 181 N. C. 461, 107 S. E. 447 (1921).
" A dissenting opinion may contain a correct statement of an abstract rule
of law, such rule of law may be as correct as any abstract rule of law, whether
from a text book, a concurring opinion, or the decision of the court. It may
be urged that since the law of one case can never be the law of another until so
adjudged, counsel must necessarily argue what he thinks is the law applicable-
subject, of course, to the discretion of the trial judge-and if counsel must
argue correct law then any argument by counsel would be open to objection,
since the law of one case in the final analysis can only be determined by the
supreme court. Jones v. Detroit Taxie Cab Co., 218 Mich. 673, 188 N. W. 394
(1922); Ross v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 198 Ill. App. 600 (1922).
The objection to reading a dissenting opinion to the jury, however, would
arise through the application of the law to the facts, since this would involve
a matter of personal discretion.
"It is an elemental principle that an erroneous decision is not bad law, it
is not law at all." Suppose that when the case of Mial v. Ellington, 134 N. C.
189, 46 S. E. 964 (1904), was being tried in the lower court, counsel has read
to the jury the dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in Taylor v. Vann, 127 N. C.
243, 37 S. E. 263 (1901). The dissenting opinion suggested that the law of the
case as determined in Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N. C. 1 (1834), should be over-
ruled. According to the Conn case, the reading of the dissent would have been
reversible error. Then upon appeal the court actually overrules Hoke v.
Henderson and adopts the dissenting opinion as the law. What would be the
result? It would seem that the court has merely corrected a mistake in the
former decisions, and that they were "not bad law, but no law at all," and that
the dissenting opinion was really the law all the time. But see (1927) 5 N. C.
L. REv. 170.
1 "On a second trial counsel cannot eulogize the justice who delivered the
opinion and endeavor to impress on the jury the latter's merits and character.
Croom v. State, 90 Ga. 430, 17 S. E. 1003 (1892).
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It may be the last supposition explains why this particular error
became a cause for reversal. For it has been held that if the judge
states the law incorrectly in his instructions, he may later recall the
jury and correct the mistake; or, that if the judge fails to make this
correction, a proper verdict will cure the error.' 3
EDWIN E. BUTLER.
Suretyship-Liability on Bond in Excess of
Statutory Penalty.
The defendant surety company executed an official bond with a
penalty of $25,000. The statute requiring such bond specified an
amount "not more than $15,000.' In a summary proceeding pro-
vided by statute for cases of default on official bonds, 2 held, that since
the surety acted voluntarily and accepted premiums on the larger
amount, it is estopped to deny the validity of the bond, and recovery
may be had for the full amount.3
When a statutory bond supersedes the statute in the amount of its
penalty, three possibilities arise: the bond may be (1) void, (2) valid
up to the statutory amount, (3) valid to the full amount of its
penalty.
Where the excessive penalty is extorted colore officii, or is not
given voluntarily, bonds have been held completely void.4 But where
the larger penalty is voluntarily assumed, the general rule is that the
bond is good to the full extent of the penalty if not prohibited by
""We believe the district attorney's law good, but even if it were bad,
verdicts are not set aside because the district attorney has argued bad law to
the jury." State v. Wren, 121 La. 55, 46 So. 99 (1908).
Also, Roundtree v. Britt, 94 N. C. 104 (1886) ; Glenn v. Charlotte & S. C.
R. R. Co., 63 N. C. 510 (1868); Vincent v. Corbin, 85 N. C. 108 (1881);
McINTosH op. cit. mspra note 7 at 673.
' N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §927.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §356.
'State v. Gant, 201 N. C. 211, 159 S. E. 427 (1931) (official bond of clerk
of superior court).
' Bail bonds have been held void where the sheriff required a larger penalty
than the court directed: Barringer v. State, 27 Tex. 553 (1864) ; Neblett v.
State, 6 Tex. App. 316 (1879) ; Roberts v. State, 34 Kan. 151, 8 Pac. 246, 6 Am.
Crim. Rep. 61 (1885) ; Waugh v. People, 17 Ill. 561 (1856). Appeal bonds have
been held void where the court exacted a larger penalty than the statute re-
quired: Commonwealth v. Wistar, 142 Pa. 373, 21 Atl. 872 (1891) ; Newcombe
v. Worster, 7 Allen 198 (Mass. 1863) ; An official bond was declared void where
an excess penalty was extorted colore offlcii by superior officers: United States
v. Humason, 6 Sawy. 199, Fed. Cas. 15421 (1879). Embargo bonds have been
held void for the same reason: United States v. Morgan, 3 Wash. C. C. 10, Fed.
Cas. 15809 (1811); United States v. Gordon, I Brock. 190, Fed. Cas. 15232
(1811), writ of error dismissed in 7 Cranch (U. S.) 287, 3 L. ed. 347 (1813).
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statute. 5 However, there are a few cases which hold that recovery
cannot be had for a greater amount than the statute provides.6
Closely analogous to the present situation is that in which the bond
supersedes the statute by requiring certain conditions for which the
statute does not provide. The general rule is that if the added or
extra-statutory conditions are separable from those required by the
statute, they will be rejected as mere surplusage, 7 since the bond is
measured by the statute.8 This rule has been applied to practically
every type of bond,9 even where the extra-statutory conditions are
Henderson v. Matlock, 9 N. C. 366 (1822) (official bond of sheriff) ; State
Bank v. Twitty, 9 N. C. 5 (1822) (official bond of sheriff); Governor v.
Witherspoon, 10 N. C. 42 (1824) (official bond of sheriff) ; Parks v. Allen, 2
Head. 523 (Tenn. 1859) (bond of the contestants of a will) ; The Stevens v.
Treasurers, 2 M'Cord. L. 107 (S. C. 1822) (official bond of a sheriff) ; State v.
Taylor, 10 S. D. 185, 72 N. W. 408, 66 Am. St. Rep. 709 (1897) (official bond
of a treasurer) ; Matthews v. Lee, 25 Miss. 417 (1853) (tax collector's bond) ;
In re Read, 34 Ark. 239 (1879) (official bond of a county treasurer) ; Bur-
roughs v. Lowder, 8 Mass. 373 (1812) (bond on a debt) ; Johnson v. Gwathney.
2 Bibb 186, 4 Am. Dec. 694 (Ky. 1810) (official bond of a sheriff); Speake v.
United States, 9 Cranch 28, 3 L. ed. 645 (1815) (embargo bond).
'Graham v. State, 66 Ind. 386 (1879) (official bond of a county auditor);
M'Caraher v. Commonwealth, 5 W. & S. 21, 39 Am. Dec. 106 (Pa. 1842)
(official bond of a recorder of deeds) ; State v. Rhoades, 6 Nev. 352 (1870)
(official bond of a state treasurer) ; Meador et at. v. Adams, 33 Tex. Civ. App.
167, 76 S. W. 238 (1903) (bond for the sale of malt liquors) ; The Treasurers
v. Bates, 2 Bail L. 362 (S. C. 1831) (official bond of a sheriff).
'United States Fidelity Co. v. Iowa Telephone Co., 174 Iowa 476, 156 N. W.
727 (1916) (bond in compliance with a municipal ordinance to insure restoration
of excavated streets).
'Globe Indemnity Co. v. Barnes, 288 S. W. 121 (Tex. Com. App., 1926)
(bond for the sale of school books to the state) ; Joint Board of Supervisors v.
Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 198 Iowa 1382, 201 N. W. 88 (1924) (drainage
contractor's bond); Tug River Lumber Co. v. Smithey, 107 W. Va. 482, 148
S. E. 850 (1929) (building contractor's bond) ; Hicks v. Randich, 106 W. Va.
109, 144 S. E. 887 (1928) (public contractor's bond).
'This rule has been most commonly applied in the case of a contractor's
bond: Wholesale Grocer Co. v. Prutsman, 1 La. App. 731 (1926); John H.
Murphy Iron Works v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 169 La. 163,
124 So. 768 (1930) ; State v. Jackson and Co., 137 La. 945, 69 So. 751 (1915) ;
Miller v. Bonner, 163 La. 332, 111 So. 776 (1927) ; Philip Carey Lumber Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 201 Iowa 1063, 206 N. W. 808, 47 A. L. R. 495 (1926) ;
Nebraska Culvert and Manufacturing Co. v. Freeman, 197 Iowa 720, 198 N. W.
7 (1924) ; Charles City v. Rasmussen, 232 N. W. 137, 72 A. L. R. 638 (1930) ;
Monona County v. O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N. W. 803 (1927); American
Surety Co. v. School District, 117 Neb. 6, 219 N. W. 583 (1928). Other kinds
of bonds where the rule has been applied are: Dallas County v. Perry National
Bank, 205 Iowa 672, 216 N. W. 119 (1927) (depository bond) ; Lee v. Waring,
3 Desauss Eq. 57 (S. C. 1809) (official bond of a state treasurer); United
States v. Howell, 14 Wash. C. C. 620, Fed. Cas. 15405 (1826) (official bond) ;
Skellinger v. Yendes, 12 Wend. 306 (N. Y. 1834) (official bond of a constable) ;
Zapf v. Ridenhour, 198 Iowa 1006, 200 N. W. 618 (1924) (broker's bond) ;
Curtis v. Michaelson, 206 Iowa 111, 219 N. W. 49 (1928) (liability insurance
bond); Pratt v. Wright, 54 Va. 175, 67 Am. Dec. 767 (1856) (guardian's
bond); Branch v. Richmond Cold Storage Co., 146 Va. 680, 132 S. E. 848
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voluntarily assumed.' 0 If the excess conditions be extorted colore
officii, the bond will be declared absolutely void by some courts."
Contra to the general rule, however, there are cases which hold
that where the extra-statutory conditions are voluntarily assumed 12
for a sufficient consideration,' 3 the bond will be enforced to the full
extent as a valid common law obligation or voluntary bond,14 pro-
vided it is not repugnant to any statute or contrary to public policy.' 5
A few courts hold that after deriving the benefits secured by the bond
the surety will be estopped to deny its validity.16
In following the weight of authority in regard to excess penalties
the instant case lays down a rule that is both reasonable and just, since
(1926) (suspending bond); State v. Read, 164 La. 315, 113 So. 860 (1927)(peace bond) ; Yost v. Ramey, 103 Va. 117, 48 S. E. 862 (1904) (executor's
bond) ; Sheppard i. Collins, 12 Iowa 570 (1861) (attachment bond) ; State v.
Castleberry, 23 Ala. 85 (1853) (bastardy bond) ; Probate Court v. Adams, 27
R. I. 97, 60 Ati. 769, 8 ANN. CAs. 1028 (1905) (executor's bond) ; Lowe v.
Guthrie, 4 Okla. 287, 44 Pac. 198 (1896) (official bond of a city clerk) ; See
Ainsworthy v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 277, 14 Pac. 590, 591 (1882) (bail
bond); State of Ohio v. Findlay, 10 Ohio 51, 54 (1840) (official bond of a
county treasurer); Sochet v. Sochet, 70 Colo. 23, 196 Pac. 192, 193 (1921)(he exeat bond); Sauer v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 192 Ky. 758, 234 S. W.
434, 436 (1921) (policeman's bond).
" Long Bell Lumber Co. v. South Dakota Car. Construction Co., 133 So. 438(La. 1931) (contractor's bond); Schisel v. Marvill et al., 198 Iowa 725, 197
N. W. 662 (1924) (contractor's bond).
"United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 115, 8 L. ed. 66 (1831) (purser's
bond); District of Columbia v. Waggman, 4 Mackey 328 (D. C. 1886) (real
estate agent's bond) ; See State ex rel Griffith v. Purcell, 31 W. Va. 44, 5 S. E.
301, 314 (1888) (injunction bond).
"Slutter v. Kirkendall, 100 Pa. St. Rep. 307 (1882) (attachment bond);
Franklin Bank v. Cooper, 36 Me. 179 (1853) (official bond of cashier covering
past receipts as well as future property) ; United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Rainey, 120 Tenn. 357, 113 S. W. 397 (1908) (official bond); Manitowoc
Co. v. Truman, 91 Wis. 14, 64 N. W. 307 (1895) (depository bond); Fitzgerald
v. Neal et al., 113 Ore. 103, 231 Pac. 645 (1924) (public contractor's bond);
Ring v. Gibbs, 26 Wend. 502 (N. Y. 1841) (bond to release a ship) ; State ex
rel Griffith v. Purcell, upra note 11.
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Rainey, supra note 12; Manitowoc Co. v.
Truman, supra note 12.
" Coons v. People, 76 Ill. 383 (1875) (official bond of a county collector);
Chadwick v. United States, 3 Fed. 750 (C. C. D. Mass. 1880) (collector's
bond) ; Taylor v. Fleckenstein, 30 Fed. 99 (C. C. D. Ore. 1887) (bail bond) ;
cases cited, supra note 12. It is interesting to note that Virginia applies this
rule only to a contractor's bond: Aetna Casualty Co. v. Earle-Lansdell Co., 142
Va. 435, 129 S. E. 263 (1925).
Taylor v. Fleckenstein, supra note 14; City of Philadelphia v. Shallcross,
14 Phila. 135 (Pa. 1880) (official bond of a tax receiver); Manitowoc Co. v.
Truman, supra note 12; Coons v. People, upra note 14; Duke v. National
Surety Co., 130 Wash. 276, 227 Pac. 2 (1924), judgment affirmed on rehearing,
131 Wash. 700, 230 Pac. 102 (1924) (bank's bond).
" Coons v. People, supra note 14; United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. (U. S.)
395, 19 L. ed. 937 (1870) (bond of licensed distiller).
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the surety in executing an official bond is presumed to know the terms
of the statute under which he executed the bond.' 7
In certain respects the case is unusual; it is a strong holding in
that the statute specifically provided that the bond be "not more than
$15,000"; and it was decided on the basis of estoppel, which basis
might be seriously questioned since it is difficult to see wherein the
surety was estopped as to the state.
It is of especial interest to note that the case involved a summary
proceeding under the statute. The summary remedy has been de-
clared constitutional in North Carolina,' 8 but its use has been denied
where the penalty superseded the statute19 as in the present case, the
reason assigned by the court being that since the bond was not in
conformity with the statute, it was not a statutory bond to which the
summary remedy would apply. As there is-no essential difference
between the then existent statute on summary remedy20 and the one
now in force, the present case is apparently a direct reversal of the
previous holding.
FRANK P. SPRUILL, JR.
Taxation-Discriminatory License Classifications--Limitations
of Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses.
The 1931 General Assembly of North Carolina imposed a license
tax of $50 per truck upon persons, firms or corporations who sell
fresh fish, fruits or vegetables and who do not maintain a permanent
place of business in the State, but exempted persons, firms or cor-
' See Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 264 S. W. 879; 880 (1929) (school con-
tractor's bond) ; Crawford v. Ozark Insurance Co., 97 Ark. 549, 134 S. W. 951,
952 (1911) (statutory bond) ; 9 C. J. 34, §56.
"Anonymous Case, 2 N. C. 29 (1794) (judgment against receivers of public
monies); Oats v. Darden, 5 N. C. 500 (1810) (summary remedy against a
sheriff); Broughton v. Haywood, 61 N. C. 380 (1867) (summary proceeding
against sureties for Clerk and Master in Equity).
" State Bank v. Twitty; Henderson v. Matlock; Governor v. Witherspoon,
all s=pra note 5.
'Acts of North Carolina Assembly of 1795, c. VIII, §5: "And be it further
enacted that when any constable or constables in any county within this state
shall or may have received any money in virtue of his office or appointment as
constable, and shall fail to pay the same to the person or persons entitled to
receive it, that then and in that case it shall and may be lawful upon motion
made in the court of the county in which said constable resides for said court
to give judgment against said constable or constables and his or their securities
for all sum or sums of money so received and collected, together with costs,
and to award execution thereon in the same manner as other executions issuing
from said court, provided, such constable has ten days previous notice of such
motion...."
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
porations selling these products if they are grown in this State or
the fresh fish taken in the waters of this State.' A specially consti-
tuted three-judge federal court declared the tax unconstitutional since
it discriminates against the products of other states and so constitutes
a burden upon interstate commerce. 2 It is surprising that, in face
of many emphatic decisions enforcing this constitutional prohibition
of State legislation discriminatory against other States' products,
such legislation actuated by local interests and flagrantly violative of
the commerce clause is still enacted. This tax which is so clearly
discriminatory raises the question of discrimination in license taxes
generally.
License classifications which discriminate against either products3
of other States or residents4 of other States are promptly condemned
by the courts. The equal protection of laws and the equal privileges
and immunities clauses which prohibit legislation aimed at non-res-
ident persons have augmented the commerce clause to prevent the
States from harassing each other with rival and spiteful measures.
A State may tax the sale within its borders of produce brought from
other States if the tax applies impartially to produce from within as
well as from without the State,5 and it may tax business within the
State conducted by non-residents, but the tax must not be unlike that
imposed upon business conducted by residents.0
When interstate commerce and non-resident considerations are not
involved in the classification, the courts recognize considerable dis-
cretion in the legislature to classify business for license taxes. De-
'N. C. PuB. LAws (1931) c. 427, §121Y2. "The Finance Committee several
times rejected a tax proposal similar to this, but in the long, drawn-out session
this modified section was enacted." Commissioner of Revenue A. J. Maxwell,
U. S. Daily, Aug. 22, 1931, at 1430. Merchants in several South Carolina towns
threatened to boycott North Carolina goods in protest against the tax.
'Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F. (2d) 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931). Suit to enjoin
the Revenue Commissioner from enforcing the act. Complainant operated
trucks selling South Carolina peaches in North Carolina. A temporary restrain-
ing order was obtained from the District Judge and an interlocutory injunction
granted by the three-judge court. No appeal was taken.
'Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347 (1875); Webber v. Vir-
ginia, 103 U. S. 344, 26 L. ed. 565 (1880) ; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446,
29 L. ed. 691 (1886). Nor may a tax discriminate against the products of the
taxing State. State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59, 42 Ati. 973 (1899).
"Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 41 Sup. Ct. 571, 65 L. ed.
1029 (1921), reversing 178 N. C. 399, 100 S. E. 693 (1919).
'Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U. S. 95, 40 Sup. Ct. 93, 64 L. ed. 157(1919).Chalker v. Birmingham and N. W. Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 522, 39 Sup. Ct. 366,
63 L. ed. 748 (1917).
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cisions under the equal protection of laws clause require that persons
who are similarly situated shall be similarly taxed.7 Although the
North Carolina constitutional provision for taxation by a uniform
rule8 applies expressly only to taxes on property, 9 the decisions have
established the rule that a license tax not uniform upon persons in
substantially the same situation is inconsistent with the intent so ap-
parent in the provision and that its collection would be restrained as
unconstitutional. 10 As such equality is guaranteed under the federal
constitution, these decisions do not promulgate a new rule. The re-
quirement of reasonable classification is satisfied when the court can
conceive that the legislature could regard the classification as having
a "connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers. 1" Thus, dif-
ferences in types of business, volume of business, opportunities
afforded the business, or burdens which the business places upon
government are held to afford reaonable bases for classification,
whereas personal attributes would not justify classification. The
differences may be minute; they are invalid only when they are
palpably arbitrary.
This equality which the courts require may be termed "formal
equality," for a classification is legal if there is a genuine difference in
business organization. This difference may not actually be an eco-
nomic justification for the dissimilar tax treatment which results.
For example, it is legal to impose a license tax on hand laundries
without imposing one on steam laundries. 12 The legislature may
select a number of businesses for special taxes, and because those
types of business are unlike others in external appearances they are
legally subject to a tax not imposed on the others. In the 1931
Revenue Act license taxes are laid on piano dealers 13 and radio
dealers,' 4 while there is not a tax on furniture dealers; manufacturers
' See Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. 184, 33 Sup. Ct. 47, 57 L. ed. 180 (1912).
'N. C. CoNsT., Art. V, §3.
'State v. Williams, 158 N. C. 610, 73 S. E. 1000 (1912).
" Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119 (1878) ; Worth v. Petersburg Ry. Co., 89
N. C. 301 (1883) ; State v. Carter, 129 N. C. 560, 40 S. E. 11 (1901) ; State v.
Williams, supra note 9; Tea Company v. Doughton, 196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E.
701 (1928).
'See American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct.
43, 45 L. ed. 102 (1900).
" Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192, 56 L. ed. 192(1912).
"N. C. Pun. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §147a.
"N. C. PuB. LAws (1931) c. 427, §147d.
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of ice cream 15 and of bottled drinks1 6 are taxed, while other manufac-
turers are not; a tax is imposed on electricians, plumbers and gas-
fitters, 17 but not on carpenters or brickmasons. Here is a departure
from a natural interpretation of equality.
It appears that this system of taxes in North Carolina has de-
veloped from a few fees imposed in 1715 for regulation of "Ordinary
Keepers and Tippling Houses," and in 1752 extended to "Traders,
Peddlers and Petty Chapmen,"' 8 with random and illogical additions
to the present time. A license system framed judiciously would seem
to have a valuable function in a revenue system. There is a group of
occupations which the State desires to restrict, and to accomplish this
it imposes a heavy tax upon them.19 Again, there are enterprises in
which State inspection is considered necessary, and a license fee can
be imposed to defray this expense.20  Also, where an occupation
causes the State an extra expense not connected with inspection a
license tax can be used for reimbursement. 21 License taxes can be
utilized to correct inequalities in taxation. There are some enter-
prises which have very little taxable property but which nevertheless
earn large profits, and the license tax is a way to offset this escape
from other taxes.22 These latter enterprises which cause extra ex-
pense or which escape other taxes present peculiar differences from
other forms of business as taxpayers, and to require a special tax
from them is not a departure from equality. The use of a license
tax merely to curtail an undesired activity is a departure from actual
equality, and it is a questionable use of the taxing power.
If there is to be more than a formal equality in license taxes, the
system should be confined to enterprises with real differences of obli-
"N. C. PUB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §161.
'N. C. Pu. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §134.
' N. C. PUB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §155.
UPARKER, HISTORY OF TAXATION IN NORTH CAROLINA DURING THE CO-
LONIAL PERIOD (1928) 129. CLARKE, LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, Vol. 23, p. 79,
371-375.
"Among these are phrenologists, fortune tellers, peddlers, employment
agents, trading stamps. N. C. PuB. LAWS (1931) c. 427 §116, §124, §121, §154,
§156.
'Licenses on hotels, restaurants, soda fountains and barber shops would
come within this classification. N. C. PUB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §126, §127,
§144, §140.
'For example, a business which conducts frequent sales may place an extra
burden upon the police; in like manner carnivals and circuses will cause extra
expense. Heavy trucks cause greater injury to the roads than lighter motor
vehicles, and the tax upon them is accordingly greater. N. C. PuB. LAWS
(1931) c. 427, §165.
" Real estate agents, peddlers, traveling carnivals.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
gation to the state, or, if business as such owes an extra obligation,23
the tax should be on all business.
In addition to a lack of actual equality in classification the license
system is subject to criticism as regards the measure of the tax on
enterprises within the same formal classification. In effect, when the
same tax applies to firms of diverse ability to pay this is a discrimina-
tion against the smaller firms. Some taxes are flat rates without re-
gard to extent of activity ;24 others are graduated according to the
population of the town in which the business operates, 25 which man-
ifestly is an inaccurate gauge of ability; other licenses are measured
by various external signs which may not be good criteria for the levy-
ing of taxes.26 If the license tax is not imposed for revenue but for
regulation, in which the ability principle is not an important consider-
ation, the measure should be selected with regard to the purpose in
view.
E. M. PERKINS.
Taxation-Exemption of Property Bought with Federal War
Risk Insurance or Compensation Money.
An act of congress1 provides that the money payable to veterans
of the World War shall be exempt from "all taxation." A later sec-
tion2 adds that "no sum payable under this chapter . . . shall be
subject . . . to national or state taxation." Three state supreme
'T. S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, Poc. NAT. TAx AssN. (1917)
185. "A large part of the cost of business is traceable to the necessity of main-
taining a suitable environment.' ". .. business ought to be taxed because it
costs money to maintain a market and those costs should in some way be dis-
tributed over all the beneficiaries of that market'
' Of 131 license taxes in the 1931 Revenue Act, 37 are flat rates, 25 are
measured according to population, and 69 have various measuring devices such
as type and size of equipment used, gross receipts, persons accommodated,
persons employed.
At first thought net income would seem to be the most equitable and effica-
cious measuring device. However, administrative difficulties of a tax measured
by net income might prohibit such a device.
'Moving pictures, soda fountains, laundries, and automotive service stations
are among those measured by population. N. C. PuB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §105,
§144, §150, §153. Obviously the individual enterprises within these groups are
of diverse profitableness.
' Various measures have been sustained. Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119
(1878) (volume of business) ; State v. Stevenson, 109 N. C. 730, 14 S. E. 385
(1891) (amount of purchases) ; Cobb v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 307, 30 S. E.
338 (1898) (gross receipts) ; State v. Carter, 129 N. C. 560, 40 S. E. 11 (1901)
(population) ; Clark v. Maxwell, 197 N. C. 604, 150 S. E. 190 (1929) (tonnage
of trucks).
143 Stat. 613 (1924), 38 U. S. C. A. §454 (1928).
243 Stat. 125 (1924), 38 U. S. C. A. §618 (1928).
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courts have construed these sections recently with somewhat varying
results. The Kansas court decided that corporate securities bought
with federal insurance money were not exempt from state taxation.3
The Georgia court decided that land bought with such money was
exempt.4 The North Carolina court held that land and an automobile
bought in part with compensation money could not escape any part of
the assessed taxation.5
The Georgia court in reaching its conclusion that, under these
statutes, land bought with federal insurance money was exempt from
all taxation, applied the specific exemption of a "sum" to property
bought with this "sum" as well. The underlying reason for the de-
cision seems to have been one of policy. The court reasons that such
exemption from state taxation adds value to the federal aid; that it
encourages World War veterans to buy homes for themselves instead
of spending foolishly the money paid them by the federal govern-
ment.
In view of this decision some pertinent questions might be raised
as to what extent the Georgia court would carry its exemption policy.
Would land for which this exempted land had been exchanged also
be exempt? Would personal property bought either with the
csum" or with the proceeds of the sale of this exempted land be
exempt? Would profit realized from transactions involving this
exempted sum be exempt even as to the income tax?G Does this
exemption apply with reference to the inheritance tax?T If either
the legal justification or the policy of this decision is followed to its
logical conclusion it seems that these questions would have to be
answered in the affirmative. The complications and absurdities to
which such holdings would lead are apparent. It would be possible
'State, ex rel Smith, Att'y. Gen'l. v. Board of County Commissioners of
Shawnee County, 132 Kan. 233, 294 Pac. 915 (1931).
' Rucker, Tax Collector v. Merck, 159 S. E. 501 (Ga. 1931).
'Martin v. Guilford County, et al, 201 N. C. 63, 158 S. E. 847 (1931).
'Bednar v. Carroll, 133 Iowa 338, 116 N. W. 315 (1908), holds that interest
on pension money exempt from taxation is not itself exempt.
The question of the application of the inheritance tax has been passed upon.
In Watkins v. Hall, 107 W. Va. 202, 147 S. E. 876 (1929), it was held that
since the heirs took as beneficiaries under the policy, they were exempt by the
express provision of these statutes from paying the inheritance tax. See also:
Commonwealth v. Rife, 119 Ohio St. 83, 162 N. E. 390 (1928) ; In re Harris'
Estate, 179 Minn. 450, 229 N. W. 781 (1930) ; The Succession of Greier, 155
La. 167, 99 So. 26 (1924). But in In re Schaefer's Estate, 224 N. Y. Supp. 305(1927), it was held that the inheritance tax was a tax on the right to inherit
and not on the property itself. Therefore, an exemption of the property by
statute would not affect this tax.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
for war veterans to build up small fortunes that the state could not
tax. It would be a very difficult task to administer the tax laws.
The policy of the decision might be further questioned. Is it the
function of the state to protect payments by the federal government
to veterans of National Wars? Granting this, it does not seem that
the protection should take the form of exempting real estate from
taxation.8
The North Carolina9 and Kansas courts ° have reached a much
more desirable result, both from the standpoint of policy in tax ex-
emptions and that of practical administration of tax laws. Congress,
they say, had no intention by these statutes to exempt property in
the states from taxation. Under these decisions no property is taken
out of taxation; the complicated problem of taxing property bought
in part only with war risk money does not arise; nor does there arise
the perplexing question as to how far and to what extent the ex-
emption should apply.
However, the reasoning of the Kansas court, which the North
Carolina court apparently adopts, leads one to believe that it would
hold the money itself taxable once it had been paid to the veteran.1 1
The court says the exemption of a "sum payable" means an exemp-
tion only while it remains payable; that is, unpaid. After it is paid
it is no longer payable, hence the provision for tax exemption does
'This would place an increased burden on tax payers by reducing the amount
of property to be taxed. Theoretically, in a state that makes no distinction
between the taxation of tangible and intangible property, there would be no less
property to be taxed, since the money paid by the veteran for the property could
be taxed in the hands of the vendor. But actually, the money paid for such
real estate could be invested in an intangible form of property and not declared,
thus escaping taxation. This would necessitate an increased tax rate, to be
borne by those who could not hide their property.
'Martin v. Guilford County, et al, supra note 5.
"0 State, ex rel Smith, Att'y. Gen'l. v. Board of County Commissioners of
Shawnee County, supra note 3.
U The Kansas court draws an analogy between the present statute and one
passed in 1873, having reference to pensions. 17 Stat. 576 (1873), 38 U. S.
C. A. 54 (1928). The court holds that "payable" in the statute under consid-
eration means the same as the words, "due or to become due" in the statute of
1873. The words of the latter statute have been construed by the Supreme
Court of the United States to provide for an exemption only up to the time of
the delivery of the money. McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U. S. 122, 22 Sup. Ct.
561, 46 L. ed. 834 (1902). But there is a distinction between these two statutes.
The last part of the statute of 1873 clearly limits the first part and makes it
applicable only to money in the process of transmission to the pensioner.
However, the New York Supreme Court in 1927 in It re Schaefer's Estate,
supra note 7, places the same interpretation on the federal statute of 1924 as
does the Kansas court in State, ex rel. Smith, Att'y. Gen'l. v. Board of County
Commissioners of Shawnee County, supra note 3.
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not apply. This construction seems contrary to the intention of con-
gress,12 and it is an unreasonable and somewhat strained interpre-
tation of the actual language of the statutes. It might lead to diffi-
culties should the actual case for the taxation of the money itself be
presented.
WILLIAM MEDFORD.
Taxation-Exemption of State Governmental Instrumentalities
from Federal Taxation.
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of motorcycles in Massachusetts,
sold one of its machines to a Massachusetts municipality for use in
its police department. An excise tax was levied and collected from
the plaintiff in conformity with Revenue Act, 1924,1 §600, which
provides that there shall be paid upon motorcycles, etc., sold or leased
by the manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax equivalent to five
per cent of the price for which so sold or leased. The plaintiff sued
to recover the amount of the tax. Held: The tax was on the sale
alone and could not be upheld as it infringed the exemption of state
governmental instrumentalities from federal taxation.2
The instant case follows the language of a bare majority decision
of the Supreme Court in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi,8 where a
state excise tax levied on the distributor of gasoline, assessed on the
number of gallons sold, was disallowed on a sale to a federal agency.
In the intervening case of Wheeler Lumber Co. v. U. S.,4 a united
court upheld a tax on transportation charges for materials sold and
shipped to state instrumentalities, on the ground that the tax was not
on the materials or the sale but on a preliminary service rendered the
seller. Decisions of a federal district court0 and of a state supreme
Congress, by these two acts, expressly provides for the exemption of this
money from taxation. The money, in the hands of federal authorities, could
not be assessed and taxed against an individual who has not received it. There-
fore, this provision for tax exemption would seem superfluous in the light of
the reasoning of the Kansas court.
Two cases have applied the provisions of the instant statute to money
already paid the veteran. Payne v. Jordan, 152 Ga. 356, 110 S. E. 4 (1921)
(money held by administrator exempt from claims of creditors of veteran) ;
Wilson v. Sawyer, 177 Ark. 492, 6 S. W. (2d) 825 (1928), (sum paid to veteran
not subject to garnishment proceedings).
143 Stat. 322 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §881 (1927).
'Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931).
Justice Stone dissents; Justice Brandeis concurs.
'277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857, 56 A. L. R. 583 (1928) which
overruled 147 Miss. 663 112 So. 584 (1927). Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone,
and McReynolds dissent.
'281 U. S. 572, 50 Sup. Ct. 419, 74 L. ed. 1047 (1930).
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court 6 have upheld taxes on the sellers of a fire engine and gasoline,
in the first case assessed on the price received, in the other on the
number of gallons sold, and in each case involving a sale to govern-
mental agencies, as being occupational excise taxes alone. The same
tendency shown in all the above cases to uphold or disallow the taxes
involved on the ground of verbal differences in the way the tax is
imposed is recognizable in cases involving franchise taxes.7
However, sporadic references to two fundamental conceptions,
although surrounded by discussions of the verbal variations of the
cases involved, lead to the conclusion that the real issue in each case
is between an absolute rule that the principle of exemption is not
affected by the extent of the resulting interference 8 and the degree
rule that immunity is given only from taxes that directly and sub-
stantially interfere with the efficient exercise of governmental func-
tions.0 The degree-rule is to be preferred because the absolute-rule
by its own inclusiveness overrules all taxes imposing even a remote
interference, whereas the degree rule sets up a flexible standard, sim-
ilar to that of the "reasonable man" test in negligence issues, under
which the court may fully consider the factual situations and the
economic consequences involved in such a tax. But no decision is
based solely upon either rule. Only in some dissenting opinions, as
of Justice Holmes in the Panhandle Oil case"0 and of Justice Stone
in the principal case" is the fundamental issue clearly shown.
'American-La France Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan, 294 Fed. 567 (W. D.
N. Y. 1923) overruled on other grounds in 6 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
'Grayburg Oil Co. v. State, 286 S. W. 489 (TEX. Civ. Ap,., 1926), affirmed
3 S. W. (2d) 427 (1928), reversed 278 U. S. 582, 49 Sup. Ct. 185, 73 L. ed. 519
(1928) in per curiam decision on authority of Panhandle case, supra note 3.
T (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 475, 477.
'There is no expressed constitutional guarantee of mutual immunity of
federal and state governmental instrumentalities from taxation, but the rule
was implied to preserve our dual system of government. Collector v. Day, 11
Wail. 113, 125, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871). The absolute rule, regardless of resulting
burdensome effect, following the "power to tax is the power to destroy" theory,
was announced in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 430, 4 L. ed. 579(1819). It has been quoted in many cases, as in the principal case, supra note
2, at 575, 51 Sup. Ct. at 603.
'Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 30, 21 L. ed. 787, 793(1873) "It cannot be said that a state tax which remotely affects the efficient
exercise of a federal power is for that reason alone inhibited by the constitu-
tion. To hold that would be to deny to the states all power to tax persons or
property." Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 524, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed.
384 (1926) ; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 391-2, 51 Sup. Ct.
170, 75 L. ed. (Adv. 223), 71 A. L. R. 1226 (1930) ; Wilcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S.
216, 225, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed. (Adv. 155), 71 A. L. R. 1260 (1930).
0 Supra note 3, at 225. "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while
this court sits .... The question of interference with government, I repeat, is
